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of tax unit against which the existingfive systems are measured and reviews the
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I. INTRODUCTION
If it is true that law is a social phenomenon which reflects a given
culture,1 then nowhere is the cultural diversity of occidental countries
more apparent than in the legal provisions which regulate the tax treat-
ment of the family. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find any two
Western nations, however close their original cultures, that presently
tax family members in exactly the same manner. The five countries
chosen for examination here - Canada, the United States, Great Brit-
ain, France and Sweden - have each developed a system of spousal
and family taxation with unique features that distinguished it in impor-
tant ways from the other four.
Canada assesses taxes separately for each individual on the basis
of a single progressive rate schedule.' In the United States, most mar-
ried couples are taxed as a unit; the spouses' incomes are added to-
gether and their taxes calculated according to a special rate schedule
which is lower than that of single people. Britain also taxes couples
jointly, but uses the same tax schedule for all tax units, distinguishing
instead between singles and marrieds through special exemptions and
deductions. A French husband, his wife and their children all file one
combined tax return, but their total income is then divided by a num-
1 Emanuelli, "Le droit compar6 selon une perspective canadienne" (1980) 40(1) Revue du
Barreau at 98.
' "Progressive" means that the percentage of tax increases as the person's income rises. All
the systems studied here use progressive tax tables.
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ber of "parts" (two parts for a couple, half a part for each of the first
two children, and so on) and the individual income tax table is applied
to the result. Sweden's system is a cross between that of Great Britain
(for the treatment of unearned income) and that of Canada (for earn-
ings from work).
The questions this article will ask are: 1) How did such differences
develop in each of these five countries? 2) Are countries consistent in
their treatment of the family under their tax and matrimonial property
laws? 3) To what extent is the tax treatment of the family affected by
non-legal factors such as societal values toward marriage, parenthood
and the promotion of equal rights for women? 4) Are there general
goals that all countries should strive to attain in their tax treatment of
the family and if so, how close do each of the five countries studied
come to reaching them?
Three means will be used to answer these questions. The first, in
Part I, is a review of the historical development of the treatment of the
family under the income tax systems of each of the five countries ex-
amined. 3 Secondly, Part II will provide a summary and synthesis of the
multitude of opinions and studies done in the last fifty years about the
objectives which the optimal tax unit should seek to attain. Thirdly and
finally, Part III will contain a comparative evaluation of the systems of
the five countries in light of the objectives determined in Part II. This
will reveal the strengths and weaknesses of each system, as well as the
ways they reflect different community values. It will also give some in-
dications of the directions in which these countries' tax units can be
expected to develop.
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
The one stable fact about taxation of the family is its constant
state of flux. No sooner has one system of spousal tax assessment been
established to please one group than another clan rises up to protest
unfair treatment of its members and demand further reforms. Conse-
quently, the five countries reviewed here have together used virtually
all the possible ways of taxing family members at some time in their
history. They are therefore an excellent source of information on the
hopes and pitfalls attending each tax unit choice.
Although many authors have written more or less comprehensive histories of the tax unit of
their own countries, and a few have done international comparisons of contemporary systems,
none have ever done a parallel overview of the historical evolution of the tax treatment of the
family in several different countries such as the one presented in this text. Matrimonial property
laws will also be described inasmuch as they are relevant.
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A. France
France's first general tax on incomes was introduced in 1914.4 The
unit subjected to the new tax was the "home", which included the fam-
ily's male head and everyone he supported. The husband/father was
solely responsible for the filing of the tax return and the payment of the
tax; his family responsibilities were recognized by means of exemptions
and deductions.
Why was it decided to tax the whole family in the man's hands?
For one thing, in 1914 the family was still an extremely cohesive social
group.5 For another, the standard matrimonial regime, which applied
to the vast majority of spouses, gave the husband absolute power over
all the family's "common" assets as well as the right to administer the
wife's "private" property and the income from any assets owned by his
minor children. In the circumstances, taxing the husband alone for all
of the family's income seemed only logical.'
The new income tax system did not remain simple very long. In
1917 it was supplemented by another type of income tax levied and
calculated on a personal basis, though people with family responsibili-
ties were entitled to some reductions. This meant that in 1930, for ex-
ample, a female storekeeper married in separation of property (through
a marriage contract) would file her own income tax form for her busi-
ness profits, but would then have to inform her husband of these profits
so he could include them along with his own income on their family's
general income tax form, which he would alone sign and be responsible
for.
In 1945 a new family tax system called the "quotient familial"
was introduced, under which the total of the family's income was first
divided into a number of equal "parts" that varied according to the
number of people in the family (one part for a single-person household,
two parts for a couple, an additional half part for each dependent
child). Each "part" was assessed an amount of tax on the basis of the
progressive tax schedule, then the taxes for all of the family's "parts"
were added together to determine the total liability of the head of the
family.
A dual system was maintained until 1959, with both income taxes
operating on a family basis. They were then integrated into a single tax
to which the "quotient familial" was applied. From 1980 on, the "quo-
4 Trotabas et Cotteret, Drot fiscal (1975) at 187s.
5 Souillac, "Le cumul des revenus du foyer familial au double point de vue de l'6tablissement
et du recouvrement de l'imp6t" (1970) 28 Cahiers de droit fiscal international at 105.
6 Ibid.
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tient" was modified to give an additional half part to parents with three
or more children.'
Many tax experts predict other changes because of the great dis-
satisfaction with the present system.8 Particularly criticized are:
1. The strong bias of the "quotient familial" in favour of high-in-
come families. By splitting income among family members, it largely
cancels out progressivity at high income levels.9 For example, the
1980 change for families with three or more children gave nothing to
families earning less than $8,000 (Cdn), while fathers earning
$130,000 and over enjoyed a tax saving of approximately $2,000 a
year.'0
2. The ever-widening gap between women's position under France's
matrimonial property laws and under its fiscal policies. As far back
as 1914, some people found joint taxation unacceptable when the
spouses were married under separation of property; they thought it
absurd that husbands should be fully responsible for reporting their
wives' incomes and paying the tax on it when the wives were under
no obligation to inform their spouses about their personal financial
affairs."1 Conversely, women resent being jointly responsible (since
1938) for the whole of the family's tax.12 They also protest the rule
which entitles only the husband to the family's tax refunds, even if
they relate to an overpayment by the wife.' 3
Recommendations for change include:
1. Replacing the "quotient familial" with a "spousal quotient" and
exemptions for children and other dependants;14
2. Establishing a ceiling on the benefits any taxpayer can receive
7 France, Minist~re du budget, (1981) Prcis defiscalitk at 63-64.
8 Louis et de Marcillac, "Incoh6rent et injuste, le systame des aides financi~res aux families a
besoin d'Etre totalement r6form6" (1981) 1 Droit fiscal at 114-115.
"Rapport au Conseil Economique et Social sur les orientations de la r6forme de l'implt sur
les revenus des personnes physiques" (1969) Statistiques et 6tudes financiares, cited in Tixier et
Gest, Droitfiscal (1976) at 158 and in Gastineau, "Rapport de la France sur le r6gime fiscal des
unit6s familiales (revenus, fortunes, successions)" (1972) 57a Cahiers de droit fiscal international
at 11-141.
9 Trotabas, "De ia dignit6 de I'individu et de la n6cessit6 de la stabilit6 familiale A travers le
droit fiscal francais" (1962) Probl~mes contemporains de droit compar6 at 403, 404; Tixier &
Gest, (1976) Droitfiscal at 159.
10 Louis & de Marcillac, supra note 8.
" Souillac, supra note 5 at 141; Gastineau, supra note 8 at 11-132; Schmitt, "LimpOt
responsable de la communaut6 universelle" (1977) Compes-rendus du 74e Congrbs des notalres
de France at 187.
" Giroud, Cent mesures pour lesfemmes (1976) at 97.
13 Zoller, "Le statut fiscal de la femme mari6e en France" in Roskamp & Forte, eds.,
Rkformes des systames fiscaux/Reforms of Tax Systems (1981) at 357.
"' "Rapport au Conseil", supra note 8.
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from the "quotient"; 15
3. Abandoning the "quotient" system altogether in favour of a sys-
tem based only on exemptions and deductions;
16
4. Introducing a separate taxation option for those who want it.Y7
B. United States'8
From the Civil War until 1948, the main principle which domi-
nated the tax treatment of the family in the United States was the
coordination of its tax and matrimonial property laws. The family was
taxed as a unit under the Civil War income tax "because common law
property rights made the husband a substantial owner of his wife's and
children's income."' 9 By 1913, when a federal income tax statute was
adopted, married women in common law states had gained full control
of their earnings and property. The few among them who had indepen-
dent incomes were therefore expected to pay taxes as separate
individuals.
The situation was more complicated in the states which had inher-
ited community of property systems through their exposure to Spanish
or French civil law (Texas, Louisiana, California, New Mexico, Ari-
zona, Washington, Nevada and Idaho). In theory, their laws provided
that marriage was a partnership vesting in each spouse a present inter-
est in one half of the couple's total income. In practice, the husband
had almost complete control over both spouses' property and earnings
for the duration of the marriage.
This ambiguity, along with the important tax savings that could be
obtained by splitting the family income in two for assessing its income
tax (because of the progressive tax schedule), led to a flurry of court
challenges culminating in 1930 in Poe v. Seaborn. It held that the
husband's powers over the community property were only those of an
"agent" and that one half of the community income should therefore
be attributed to each spouse for tax purposes. Many people 21 had diffi-
" Ibid. at 160; also in Schmitt, supra note 11 at 181.
16 Rapport Documentation Franqais (1975) at 59, cited in Tixier & Gest, supra note 8.
17 BolI6, "La femme mari6e et l'imp8t sur le revenu" (1976) 54 Juris-Classeur Pbriodique.
18 The main sources used in preparing this section are:
Bittker, "Federal Income Taxation and the Family" (1976) 27 Stan. L. Rev. at 1389-1463. Thor-
son, "An Analysis of the Sources of Continued Controversy Over the Tax Treatment of Family
Income" (1965) 18(2) Nat. Tax J. at 113-132.
19 Thorson, supra note 18 at 115.
20 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
1 Boyd, "Disparity in Federal Income Tax Rates: Discrimination Against the Single Tax-
payer" (1970-71) 4 Indiana Legal Forum at 386s.
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culty reconciling this with the conclusions reached in Lucas v. Earl22
the same year. In that case, the spouses had a marriage contract speci-
fying that each of them would have immediate equal rights of property
and control over half of everything they acquired. The Court held that
the wife should be taxed on the income from her half share on the
spouses' savings, but that the husband was alone taxable on the earn-
ings from his work.
These two decisions created widespread feelings of unfairness and
almost twenty years of legislative chaos. Husbands from common law
states felt disadvantaged compared to their counterparts from commu-
nity property states who paid much lower taxes on the same income.
Couples whose income was derived entirely from the husband's work
resented the fact that spouses with savings and assets could artificially
reduce their tax burden by rearranging the ownership of their proper-
ties between them. One common law state after another abandoned
centuries of legal tradition to adopt community property systems to en-
title their residents to the tax windfall this brought about.
Spurred by these criticisms and by the desire to substantially re-
duce taxes after World War II, Congress decided in 1948 to extend the
benefit of full income splitting to all married couples. Although this
new regime seemed perfect to some who thought the tax unit problem
had been solved "for all time",23 it didn't take long to spring a number
of leaks. Widowed and divorced people with dependants resented hav-
ing to pay much higher taxes than married people.24 Single taxpayers
protested against the sometimes enormous difference (as much as 42%)
between their taxes and those of married couples with the same
income.
2 5
These problems finally led to the 1969 changeover to a new system
with four different tax rate schedules: one for married couples filing
jointly, another (higher one) for married couples filing separately, one
for singles and one for heads of households. The gap between singles
and marrieds was reduced so that spouses no longer received the
equivalent of full splitting. On the contrary, many couples with both
spouses in the labour force now found that their tax burden increased
when they married and protests against this new "marriage penalty"
gathered wide support.26
22 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
" Pechman, "Income Splitting" (1959) Tax Revision Compendium at 473.
24 Bittker, supra note 18 at 1417.
25 Ibid. at 1419.
"' Cook, "The Frustrations of the Marriage Tax" (1981) Tax Notes at 265; H. Boyler v.
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At the same time, women's increased participation in the labour
market in the 1960s and 70s made them more aware and critical of the
disincentive effect they suffered because joint taxation taxed their first
dollar of income at the highest rate applicable on their husbands' earn-
ings.2 7 This was buttressed by many American and British studies dem-
onstrating that married women's labour force participation is much
more easily discouraged than men's because of the additional house-
keeping, child-care and other expenses the family incurs when both
spouses work outside.2 8 Feminists also challenged the joint taxation as-
sumption that spouses pool and share all their income. 9
The first concession these critics obtained was a child-care expense
deduction for mothers in the labour force, later broadened into a tax
credit. This was judged insufficient, however, and political pressure in-
tensified to the point where, in 1981 alone, the following were intro-
duced in the House of Representatives:
30
- four bills proposing tax reductions to alleviate the marriage
penalty;
- ten bills to give married persons the choice of filing under the sin-
gle rate schedule;
- twelve bills introducing a system of separate taxation of the
spouses.
The one concrete result of that year was President Reagan's mar-
riage penalty reduction law.31 It provided a deduction of 5% of the first
$30,000 of earnings of the lower-income spouse for 1982 and 10% of
the same maximum for 1983 and following years.
Commissioner & A. Boyter v. Commissioner(1980), 74 T.C. 72; and U.S. Congress, (1980) Hear-
ings on the Marriage Penalty Tax at 182.
27 Hon. Griffiths, "Opening Statement at the Hearings Before the U.S. Congress Joint Eco-
nomic Committee" (1973) Economic Problems of Women. Also see Bittker, supra note 18 at
1431-3; Nussbaum, "The Tax Structure and Discrimination Against Working Wives"(1972)
25(2) Nat. Tax J. at 183-191; Quester, "The Effect of the Tax Structure on the Labor Marker
Behavior of Wives" (1977) 29(3) J. of Econ. and Bus. at 171-180; Musgrave, "Women and Taxa-
tion", in Roskamp & Forte, eds., supra note 13 at 341-354.
2'8 Rosen, "Is It Time to Abandon Joint Filing?" (1977) 30(4) Nat. Tax J. at 426-7; Boskin,
"Factor Supply and the Relationships Among the Choice of Tax Base, Tax Rates, and the Unit of
Account in the Design of an Optimal Tax System" in Aaron & Boking eds., The Economics of
Taxation (1980) at 154-5;Greenhalgh & Mayhew, "Labour Supply in Great Britain: Theory and
Evidence" in Hornstein et al. eds., The Economics of the Labour Market (1980).
29 Munnell, "The Couple Versus the Individual Under the Federal Personal Income Tax" in
Aaron & Boskin, eds., ibid. at 266; Gann, "Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in Allocating
Income Tax Burdens" (1980) 59(1) Tex. L. Rev. at 25.
20 Cited in Moerschbaecher, "The Marriage Penalty and the Divorce Bonus: A Comparative
Examination of the Current Legislative Proposals" (1981) 5(2) Rev. of Taxation of Individuals at
133-146.
31 Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, reprinted in (1981) 3 U.S. Code
Cong. & Ad. News.
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But the critics are still not satisfied...
C. Great Britain
32
From the inception of the income tax in Great Britain during the
Napoleonic wars in 1799 until the present day, the general rule has
been that the income of the spouses is combined and taxed in the hus-
band's hands using the same tax rate as for single people. The British
Finance Act of 1842 stated that the "profits of any married woman
living with her husband shall be deemed the profits of her husband."'3
That system, whose origin is attributed to married women's "servile"
status and their lack of control over their own property until the Mar-
ried Women's Property Act of 1882,a4 remained essentially unchanged
until 1971.
Ever since British wives gained control of their property in the
1880s, they have made frequent and vigorous complaints about the tax
treatment of their own incomes. 35 Concessions were first granted in
1894, with the institution of a separate exemption on the wife's earn-
ings to recognize "that earning wives in tax units with moderate in-
comes incurred extra expenses as a result of working."3 In 1914, the
option of a separate assessment of the spouses' tax was introduced.
This allowed wives to file a separate return, but as the tax was still
calculated on the basis of the spouses' total income, this option had
little more than symbolic significance.
After the War (1918), all married men were given a "wife allow-
ance" whether or not their wives had jobs outside the home. The gov-
ernment also established a Royal Commission on the Income Tax,
whose conclusions about the proper unit of taxation were that:
The incomes are aggregated because the law of taxable capacity is the supreme
law in matters of taxation, and taxable capacity is, in fact, found to depend on
the amount of the income that accrues to the married pair, and not upon the way
in which that income happens fortuitously to be owned by the members of that
32 The main sources used in preparing this section are:
- U.K. Royal Commission of the Taxation of Profits and Income (1954) Second Report at 35-
41.
- Marshall & Walsh, "Marital Status and Variations in Income Tax Burdens" (1970) 4 Br.
Tax Rev. at 236-249.
- U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer, The Taxation of Husband and Wife (1980).
Cited in Barr, "The Taxation of Married Women's Incomes - Part I" (1980) 6 Br. Tax.
Rev. at 478.
34 Ibid.
"I Lloyd George called the question of the desirable size of the tax unit a "hardy perennial".
(1909) II U.K. House of Commons Debates, Official Report, cited in Marshall & Walsh, supra
note 29 at 58.
31 Marshall & Walsh, supra note 32 at 237.
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union. It is beyond question that in the immense majority of cases where the wife
has separate means she contributes to the common purse, either by the actual
merger of her income with her husband's, or by bearing expenses which in less
fortunate households would fall upon the husband.37
In the 1940s, inspired by the need for female labour, the govern-
ment twice raised the exemption on wives' earnings, thus giving a mar-
ried couple a much greater tax deduction than two single people with
the same total income. This had the effect of "encouraging wives in the
lower classes to work outside the home, reflecting the desire of the leg-
islators to increase the labour force participation of married women in
the factories." 38 When a Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits
and Income was set up in the early 1950s, it
.. .received such a volume of representations from different quarters to the ef-
fect that aggregation of the incomes of husband and wife ought to be abolished
and the income of each assessed as that of a separate individual that we find it
necessary to express an opinion. ..9
That opinion was that joint taxation should be retained because
otherwise "(t)here would be a natural tendency for husbands to try to
arrange to transfer so much of their incomes to their wives as would
produce an equal division",40 which would minimize their taxes. The
Commission also said it wasn't worried about the exceedingly high tax
rates which high-income professional couples had to pay because of
joint taxation, since this affected so few people and was unlikely to dis-
courage anyone from getting married.4'
In spite of this, well-off two-earner couples kept up their lobbying
until 1971, when they finally obtained the wife's earnings election,
under which a married woman could be taxed as a single person on the
income from her own work. If this election was made - and it could
only be made if the woman and her husband requested it in writing -
the man could only claim a single person's exemption. As a result, only
couples earning $30,000 a year or more benefitted from this new
option.4
2
At least one commentator believed that this 1971 change spelled
the end of the joint taxation controversy. 43 He was proved wrong in
37 Cited in U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer, supra note 32 at 58.
38 Marshall & Walsh, supra note 32 at 242.
" U.K. Royal Commission on the Taxation of Profits and Income, supra note 32 at 36-7.
40 Ibid. at 37.
41 Ibid. at 36.
42 Jeffrey-Cook, "Separate Taxation of Wife's Earnings"
(1980) 6 Br. Tax Rev. at 439-441.
41 Coombe, "The income, fortune and estate tax treatment of household units: Report of the
United Kingdom" (1972) LVIIa Cahiers de droit fiscal international at 11-263.
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1978, when a booklet entitled Income Tax and Sex Discrimination"
produced a deluge of more than 2,000 letters, 730 of which specifically
demanded that the tax system treat married women as separate indi-
viduals. 5 The ensuing public debate led the government to commission
a Green Paper on the Taxation of Husband and Wife, released in
1980.46 Without taking a definite stand, the Green Paper delineated
two main courses:
1. Allowing the spouses to choose between traditional joint taxation
in the husband's hands, totally separate taxation or joint assessment
with joint and equal liability; or
2. Changing to a new system of Canadian-style mandatory indepen-
dent taxation of all individuals.
Most of the briefs presented to the British government in response
to the Green Paper favoured the separate taxation route.4 This did not
lead to the implementation of such a system in Great Britain, though,
partly because of disagreements between the supporters of independent
taxation about the way such a system should work.4 8 The main dispute
concerned the exemptions to be assigned to single people, one-earner
and two-earner couples. The principal contending options were:
1. Separate taxation with each spouse having a personal exemption
that is fully transferable to the other spouse if one of them stays
home. This is supported by the more conservative "pro-family"
groups, but rejected by modern organizations which argue that: (a)
spousal exemptions do not necessarily help families, since they are
given regardless of the presence of children or other dependants; (b)
transferable exemptions between spouses act as a barrier to women's
participation in the labour force, since husbands' taxes would rise
when their wives take paid jobs; and (c) exemptions give most help
to high-income families, and little or nothing to those with low in-
comes who need it most. 9
2. Separate taxation with non-transferable personal exemptions, cash
44 U.K. Equal Opportunities Commission (1977).
4 Mentioned in With All My Wordly Goods I Thee Endow ... Except my Tax Allowances
(1979), which the U.K. Equal Opportunities Commission produced to describe the response to its
1977 booklet on taxation.
46 U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer, supra note 32.
47 See items on the "Taxation of Husband and Wife" in Taxation Sept. 5 1981 at 620; Sept.
12 at 651-652; Sept. 26 at 705; Oct. 10 at 37; and Oct. 17 at 65. Also The Economist Dec. 19
1981 at 12-13.
48 Letter to the author by Helen Lindars, Policy Unit, Equal Opportunities Commission
(Oct. 27, 1983)
49 Wilkinson, "The Discriminatory System of Personal Taxation: Some Proposals for Re-
form" (1982) 11(3) J. of Soc. Pol. at 313.
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payments for dependent children and, in some proposals, a tax reduc-
tion for older wives who spent most of their lives at home.5
3. An intermediate approach with partially transferable deductions,
where a one-earner couple would be entitled to a deduction more or
less equal to the present Married Man's Allowance (about 160% of a
single exemption).
The failure to reach a consensus has stalled the British movement
toward family taxation reform. At the end of 1983, a representative of
the Equal Opportunities Commission wrote to the author that "[t]he
impetus which existed in the 1970s has been lost.""1
D. Sweden
52
Income tax is a very old institution in Sweden, going back to the
end of the sixteenth century, when taxes were occasionally levied on
estimated incomes. The system crystallized in a 1710 statute which im-
posed a 20% tax on salaries, wages and pensions. Progressive tax rates
were introduced in 1902 and became a permanent feature of the system
in 1910.
Until 1874, the Swedish tax unit reflected the country's matrimo-
nial property laws, under which "[t] he property of the husband and the
property of the wife constituted a unit" 53 that was administered by the
husband. As a result, the husband was alone responsible for reporting
the family's income and paying its tax. From 1874 on, tax and family
laws started to diverge: married women gained control over their work
earnings, but husbands continued to be responsible for all the taxes.
When the Code of 1920 granted full emancipation and complete con-
trol over their own property to women, the tax unit remained the fam-
ily so the break between the two sets of laws became complete.
This was not immediately perceived to be a problem:
50 U.K. Equal Opportunities Commission, The Taxation of Husband and Wife: Response of
the Equal Opportunities Commission to the Government Green Paper (1981); also mentioned in
Wilkinson, supra note 49 at 325; also Institute for Fiscal Studies, The Structure and Reform of
Direct Taxation (1978) at 382-385.
8' Supra note 48.
82 The main sources used in preparing this section are:
- Sprague Barner, Director, World Tax Series: Taxation in Sweden (1959).
- Bj6rklund, "Die Gemeinsame Veranlagung von Mitgliedern Desselben Haushalts und die
Haftung der Haushaltsmitgliedern ffir die Entrichtung der Steuern in Schweden" (1955) 28 Ca-
hiers de droit fiscal international at 30-45.
- Bj6rne, "Sweden's Report on the Income, Fortune and Estate Tax Treatment of Household
Units" (1972) 57a Cahier de droit fiscal international at 11/275-11/291.
- Lindencrona, Trends in Scandanavian Taxation (1979).
83 Schmidt, "The Prospective Law of Marriage", Scandanavian Studies in Law (1971) at
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Originally there was not much debate about joint taxation. This principle was
supposed to be more or less self-evident. Marriages were stable, the husband was
the only bread-winner and the ability to pay taxes was consequently measured by
the income of the household instead of the income of each individual."
The main factor which changed the situation was the increasingly
steep progressivity of the rate schedule. By the end of World War II,
the exceedingly high tax burdens of parents and two-earner couples
compared to those of unmarried taxpayers had become intolerable. The
first reform came in 1947 with the abolition of the deductions for chil-
dren and the introduction of family allowances. A number of studies
followed, the most important originating from the Tax Committee of
1949,55 which identified two main alternatives: (1) separate taxation of
the spouses; and (2) full splitting of spousal incomes. It recommended a
compromise solution: introducing an additional tax schedule for mar-
ried couples that would combine full splitting at low income levels with
gradually less splitting as the couples' incomes rose.
This compromise was implemented in 1952. The new system also
distinguished between one and two-earner couples through an earned-
income deduction for wives in the labour force. In 1960, the tax unit
was extended to include unmarried cohabitants. This put an end to the
increasingly widespread practice among upper-income couples of co-
habiting without marriage or of getting a so-called "tax divorce",
which meant that "a married couple divorced and then lived apart until
their new status had been accepted by the tax authorities, after which
they secretly moved back together.
'5 6
The next move came from women's organizations. In the early
1960s, they made Sweden's joint taxation system the focus of a "vast
debate" and criticized it for going against the trend toward making the
sexes more equal.6 7 Most objectionable was the "threshold effect"
which discouraged housewives from taking paid jobs. This was ac-
knowledged by experts:
It has been widely discussed in the Scandinavian countries if, and in that case to
what extent, the willingness to work and make extra efforts is influenced by taxa-
tion. Opinions have been very different. As to joint taxation and the willingness
of women to work outside the household the effect was, however, obvious to ev-
eryone. In a country with strongly progressive income tax rates the net effect of a
woman's employment was very small if her husband was already gainfully
" Lindercrona, supra note 52 at 30.
" The report of the 1949 Tax Committee is described at length in Bj6rklund, supra note 52
at 36-41.
" Sundberg, "Recent Changes in Swedish Family Law: Experiment Repeated" (1975) 23
Am. Jour. of Comp. Law at 39.
57 Su&de, Le statut de la femme en Subte - Rapport aux Nations Unies (1968) at 59-60.
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employed.""
Since feminist demands for change coincided with a labour
shortage in Sweden, reforms were very swift. A separate filing option
for spouses' earnings was introduced in 1965, followed in 1970 by the
abolition of joint taxation of the earnings of married (and cohabiting)
couples. This did not affect incomes from profits, properties and sav-
ings, which continued to be taxed jointly. Other remaining joint fea-
tures included a few transferable "family" deductions as well as a mar-
ital credit for taxpayers whose spouses had little or no earnings. This
credit was intended to be a transitional measure for families where the
wife was "too old to receive training" or where the spouses were "living
in a place where there are no job opportunities." 59
Feminists had hoped to gain the separate taxation of all types of
incomes soon afterwards, but this did not happen. Their only victory in
that area since 1970 has been the extension of individual taxation to
the earnings of wives and husbands who work in the same business or
farm (1976). These spouses had been obliged to file joint returns until
then. The lack of further progress toward separate taxation was ex-
plained in 1979 as follows:
The last step, the introduction of complete separate taxation, has not been taken
in any Scandinavian country. Unearned income and net wealth is still taxed
jointly. The reason for this is to a large extent another important factor in Scan-
dinavian taxation: the growing fear of tax avoidance. The legislator does not feel
able to foresee the consequences of the complete abolition of joint taxation for
unearned income and fears that tax avoidance could be facilitated. Another fac-
tor is that the introduction of completely separate taxation is not deemed neces-
sary from a labour market point of view. 0
E. Canada"1
Compared to most others, the history of Canada's tax treatment of
the family is remarkably sedate and uneventful. Ever since 1917, when
the federal Income War Tax Act was introduced, the Canadian unit of
taxation has always been the individual. Only one tax schedule exists
8 Lindencrona, supra note 52 at 31.
Odhnoff, Minister for Youth and Family Affairs, Sweden, "The Family in a Changing
Society: Problems and Responsibilities of Its Members: Sweden" (Paper presented to a United
Nations Interregional Seminar, 1973) at 8.
60 Lindencrona, supra note 52 at 31.
61 The main sources used in preparing this section are:
- Mockler, Smith and Frenette, Taxation of the Family, Study No. 10 of the Royal Commis-
sion on Taxation (1964).
- London, Tax and the Family, (1975).
- London, "Taxation of the Family United" 1974 Conference Report at 297-316.
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and family responsibilities are recognized through exemptions for
spouses and children.
As the original Canadian and American income tax systems were
almost identical, it is particularly interesting to see why Canada has
never swerved from its original path while the United States took a
very different course. This is found in the radically different ways in
which Canada dealt with the two main challenges that destroyed the
American separate taxation system - the treatment of spouses mar-
ried in community of property and the prevention of artificial income-
splitting by couples with substantial unearned income.
The Canadian counterpart of the American community property
states is the province of Quebec, whose family laws originated in
France. Until recently, the standard matrimonial regime of Quebec was
very similar to the old American community property regimes de-
scribed earlier; theoretically the spouses were equal partners, but in
fact the husband had almost unlimited control over all or most of their
property. Possibly because upper-income Quebeckers routinely opted
out of their province's community regime through pre-nuptial con-
tracts, it was not until 1957 that the Canadian equivalent of Poe v.
Seaborn62 reached the Supreme Court of Canada. In the Canadian
Sura case, 63 the spouses were denied the right to each declare half of
their total income for tax purposes because the wife did not "have the
exercise of the plenitude of rights which ownership normally con-
fers. . . . [T]he result is that the wife receives no income from com-
munity property. ' 64 The husband therefore had to pay tax on the whole
amount.
This did not settle the community property issue for all time. On
the contrary, the wording of Sura indicated that if a province changed
its matrimonial regime to a California-style community system with
joint control by the spouses, people married under such a regime would
probably be entitled to full income splitting. However, more than
twenty-five years have gone by without much pressure on the provinces
to adopt such a regime, which tells something about the price - in
higher taxes - husbands are willing to pay to maintain the upper hand
over their families' finances. Stranger still, not a single Canadian case
has been reported of spouses attempting to split their incomes on the
basis of a marriage contract similar to that involved in the American
42 Supra note 20.
Frank Sura v. Minister of National Revenue [1957] 62 D.T.C. 1005.
64 Ibid. at 1008-9.
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case of Lucas v. Earl.65 Although several experts believe that such a
manoeuvre would have little chance of success, 6 at least one thinks
otherwise 6 7 and the technique has been found acceptable under the
Quebec Income Tax Act. 8
To prevent well-off spouses from reducing their taxes by transfer-
ring assets to each other, Canada's first and subsequent income tax acts
specified that income from property transferred by one spouse to the
other, or by parents to their children, would be attributed back to the
transferor for tax purposes. In practice, however, these so-called "attri-
bution rules" have been called "illogical, arbitrary and often unfair" 69
because the loopholes various court decisions created in them were
"wide enough to drive a truck through".70 The most glaring of these
holes are:
1. The definition of "property" as used in the attribution sections
does not include "businesses";
2. Until the May 1985 budget,7 1 the term "transfer" did not include
loans between family members, even demand loans without interest;
3. Although attribution rules apply to transfers by way of trusts, they
do not cover transfers of property to corporations of which the trans-
feree spouse or child is the shareholder.
Until 1980, the tax act also prevented employers from deducting
as expenses the salaries they paid to their spouses in unincorporated
businesses or farms. This prohibition was repealed following protests
from women's groups. 2
65 Supra note 22.
66 Eng, "Tax Consequences of Provincial Family Law Reform Legislation" (1978) 26 Can.
Tax J. at 562; McNair, "The Income Tax Implications of Matrimonial Property Law Reform -
The Common Law Provinces" 1979 Conference Report at 268; Lareau, "Les implications fiscales
des transferts de biens effectu6s sous la loi sur les biens matrimoniaux de Nouveau-Brunswick"
(1981) 29 Can. Tax J. at 157; Ellis, "An Income Tax Perspective on British Columbia Marriage
Agreements" (1981) 15(1) U.B.C. Law Rev. at 155.
67 London, "Taxation of the Family United", supra note 61 at 109-110. London writes about
s. 56(4), which prevents transfers of income other than property between family members for tax
purposes, that:"[O]ne might question ...whether a present assignment of future income is
caught within its terms. One can read that section to say that it is only income in the year of the
assignment itself which is included in the income of the assignor and not income earned in years
subsequent to the assignment."
68 Jolin, "Aspects fiscaux des r6gimes matrimoniaux au Qu6bec" Journ&es d'9tudes fiscales
1979 at 86.
69 MacGowan, "The Tax Consequences of Marriage" 1974 Conference Report at 278.
70 London, "Taxation of the Family United", supra note 61 at 110; see also Aikman, "In-
come Splitting Among Family Members" 1977 Conference Report at 189.
71 Canada, Department of Finance, Securing Economic Renewal: Budget Papers, May 1985
at 63.
72 Canadian Advisory Council on the Status of Women, "Annotated Recommendations on
Women and Taxation" (1978) at 4. Salaries paid to spouses are still not recognized for unemploy-
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The extent and impact of income splitting between family mem-
bers in Canada have never been documented, but it is clear from the
above that even after the May 1985 changes, the possibilities for in-
come splitting by people who own substantial assets are considerable.
This was one of the main reasons why the Carter Commission recom-
mended in 1966 that Canada abandon separate taxation in favour of a
taxpaying unit which would include the spouses and their dependent
children. The Commission's other reason for supporting family taxation
was its belief that the family was "the basic economic unit in
society".
73
When the federal government responded in 1969 to the Carter
proposals, it rejected the taxation of the family as a unit because: (1) it
would impose a "tax on marriage"; and (2) it would greatly increase
the tax rates of wives.7 4 Women's views seem to have played a signifi-
cant role in this decision. An internal Finance Department document
7 5
warned that women would oppose joint taxation because they stood to
lose much more under it than under the current system already under
attack by women's groups. Robert Bryce, Canada's Deputy Minister of
Finance from 1966 to 1970, also reported to the author that the gov-
ernment officials of the time were influenced by the fact that all their
wives were opposed to joint family or spousal taxation.
The last official examination of Canada's tax unit was done in
1975-76 by a federal Interdepartmental Committee on the Taxation of
Women. 7 On the issue of the tax unit, the committee was split down
the middle. Half of its members, led by the Revenue Department, sup-
ported joint spousal taxation because they found it fairer and thought it
would simplify the administration of the tax system. The other mem-
bers were equally adamant that only separate taxation was fair because
joint taxation would discriminate against employed women and create
an undesirable tax on marriage. The conclusion of the second group
was summarized by the federal Coordinator for the Status of Women:
Joint returns are an idea whose time has passed. During the 1950s and '60s when
most wives worked in the home, it would perhaps have been a better tax system
ment insurance purposes.
73 Canada, 3 Report of the Royal Commission of Taxation (1966) at 123.
74 Hon. Benson, Minister of Finance, Proposals for Tax Reform (known as the "White Pa-
per on Tax Reform") (1969) at 14-15.
75 Canada, Department of Finance, "A Marital or Family Unit" (Unpub. paper 1969) at 8.
11 This conversation took place on Jan. 9, 1982 in Ottawa, on the occasion of the Tax Reform
Conference of the Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives.
77 Canada, "Report of the Interdepartmental Committee on the Taxation of Women" (Un-
pub. paper 1976).
[VOL. 23 NO. I
Taxation of Spouses
than individual returns. In the 1970s, however, when the government is making
such efforts to improve the status of women by recognizing them as individuals
outside the family unit, it would seem a retrograde step .... 78
III. GOALS WHICH TAX UNITS SHOULD TRY TO ACHIEVE
As Part I demonstrated, the choice of the appropriate tax unit has
not always been based on a careful and rational assessment of the al-
ternatives. Often, short-term political considerations such as the desire
to raise or lower taxes or to appease an annoyingly squeaky wheel have
dominated instead. To compensate for this lack of forethought, aca-
demics, tax practitioners and other interested people have discussed the
rationales and respective merits of the various tax unit options in rela-
tion to two main questions: 1. What is the best tax unit? and 2. What
is the appropriate relationship between different categories of units or
taxpayers?
A. What is the Best Tax Unit?
When discussing which tax unit is best, "neutrality toward the
marriage decision" and "taxing families with the same income at the
same rate" are common criteria. Then it is noted that these criteria
cannot co-exist under a progressive rate structure, but "the treatment
of the tax unit must inevitably be a matter of compromise between a
number of conflicting considerations."7 9 With all due respect, this ap-
proach is neither logical nor helpful since "taxing families with the
same incomes. . . ." is not a criterion at all, but merely one of the
possible conclusions that may or may not be reached after analyzing
the basic principles (the criteria) upon which everyone, or almost ev-
eryone, agrees.
After eliminating such "false" criteria from the analyses, the re-
maining three criteria are:
1. Fairness - This requires that the population be generally satisfied
that the tax unit chosen is appropriate to assess people's ability to
pay. Secondly, this criterion requires that all types of income be
taxed in the same manner unless there is a valid reason for doing
otherwise.
2. Neutrality - The tax unit should affect life choices as little as
possible, particularly decisions regarding marriage, taking a job
78 Memo by Julie Loranger, then federal Coordinator for the Status of Women, to the Hon.
Marc Lalonde, then Minister Responsible for the Status of Women (and Minister of National
Health and Welfare) (Dec. 21, 1976)
7 Meade, supra note 50 at 377.
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outside the home and the transfer of property to spouses and
children.
3. Simplicity - A good tax unit is one that is reasonably easy for
the taxpayer to understand and for the tax authorities to administer.
1. Fairness
A 1960 article by American law professors Oldman and Temple
greatly influenced the future of the U.S. tax unit as well as the deliber-
ations of the Carter Commission."0 After summarizing their interna-
tional survey of tax systems of the late 1950s, Oldman and Temple
concluded that:
The initial question countries have had to answer in approaching the allocation
of tax burdens is whether or not the characteristics of the marriage relationship
are such that all married couples with the same total incomes should pay approx-
imately the same total tax.81
They thought.that countries which aggregated spousal incomes saw the
married couple as "a common pool of income or wealth" constituting
"a spending or utilizing unit"; that "for the purposes of any reasonable
policy of progressive taxation, the economic lives of a husband and wife
are inseparable";82 and that "taxation of the married couple as a unit is
more reasonable, in terms of economic realities and administrative fa-
cility, than separate taxation of the spouses. '"83
No evidence is given that Oldman and Temple asked the countries
using joint taxation why they did so; as well, the authors ignored the
more than one-third of countries surveyed which were using separate
taxation. This, and the fact that the OECD reports a steady move away
from joint taxation among its member countries during the 1960s and
'70S,84 indicates that Oldman and Temple's large following in North
America in the fifteen years after the publication of their article owed
more to their eloquence than the scholarship of their views.
Returning to Oldman and Temple's starting point, the "initial
question" countries asked themselves about the nature of the marriage
relationship when choosing a tax unit, and comparing it with historical
realities, we note that none of the five countries took such a philosophi-
80 Oldman & Temple, "Comparative Analysis of the Taxation of Married Persons" (1960)
12 Stan. L. Rev. at 585-605.
81 Ibid. at 596.
82 Ibid. at 597.
83 Ibid. at 603.
84 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Committee on Fiscal Affairs,
The Treatment of Family Units in OECD Member Countries Under Tax and Transfer Systems
(1977).
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cal approach. On the contrary, the starting point in all five cases was
the assumption that the tax unit should correspond to property rights
under the civil law. Where matrimonial property rules treated the
couple or the family as a unit under the control of the male head of the
household (France, Great Britain, Sweden), tax law simply did the
same. In the countries where wives had gained control of their property
when the first permanent income tax provisions were introduced (Can-
ada, the United States in 1913), it was taken for granted that the tax-
payer would be the individual.
Typically, the philosophical arguments about the alleged special
characteristics of the marital unit only arose when tax and property
laws had drifted apart and the split between them was being chal-
lenged. This happened in Great Britain in the 1920s and in Sweden in
the 1940s. By 1940, joint taxation had not yet gained much acceptance
in the United States, as demonstrated by Shoup's conclusion that
whether spouses should be treated as a tax unit or not depended largely
upon the two following factors: "the treatment of imputed income
under the tax law and the division of control, actual and potential, of
the family's total income between the spouses."8 5 As no information
existed on "the actual degree of control each spouse exercises over his
income", Shoup concluded the matter would "require special study
before any particular technique can be recommended for a given time
and place." 86
Stanley Surrey, architect of the 1948 U.S. changeover to full split-
ting for all spouses, was the first American to defend the view of
spouses as an economic unit. He did not argue that spouses pooled all
their income and assets, but that they are "the economic unit of con-
sumption." 8 This justified taxing same-income couples at the same
level, something he found desirable to reduce litigation on artificial
splitting, to solve the community property anomaly, to answer "the in-
sistent demand for a tax incentive for upper bracket executives" 88 and
to reduce income taxes after World War II. Given all these perceived
benefits as well as the fact that the Poe v. Seaborn8 9 case had already
rejected Shoup's criterion of "actual control" by granting full splitting
to all community property spouses even though the wife usually con-
"' Shoup, Columbia University, "Married Couples Compared With Single Persons Under the
Income Tax" (1940) 25 Bulletin of the Nat. Tax Assoc. at 130.
80 Ibid. at 135.
87 Surrey, "Family Income and Federal Taxation" (1946) Taxes at 985.
88 Ibid. at 986.
89 Supra note 20.
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trolled nothing at all, Surrey's proposals were irresistible.
The result was that from 1946 on, and for the next 25 years, al-
most all American tax experts unquestioningly accepted the spousal
unit postulate. 90 In 1964, when the Carter Commission issued its back-
ground paper on taxation of the family, it buttressed its conclusion -
that a married couple was an economic unit - by reproducing most of
the Oldman and Temple article.9' After stating that "[v]irtually no in-
formation is available on the pooling of family resources in Canada",
the background paper went on to recommend that all spouses be jointly
taxed. However, it rejected the inclusion of children in the tax unit
because:
• . .this treatment depends entirely upon the validity of the premise that the
income of minor children is pooled and shared with all the family. We have little
or no statistics on this point.92
As all the tax experts who supported joint spousal taxation agreed
that "pooling and sharing" was the crucial assumption on which they
based their view, it is remarkable that not a single survey was ever
carried out in North America to verify its accuracy. When American
professors McIntyre and Oldman wrote that "married couples should
be assumed to share their income equally" because "common experi-
ence suggests that at least partial pooling of sources to finance commu-
nity consumption is almost universal", 93 the best support they could
find for this assumption was a 1965 article based on unsupported state-
ments of various sociologists in the 1950s and early '60s (the most up-
to-date reference being a book entitled Building a Successful Mar-
riage).94 Generalized pooling and sharing is now a fundamental tenet
of the American and British tax systems, but the foundation on which
they are built is still a mystery.
Pahl, who made the only serious survey - in Great Britain - of
the extent of sharing within marriage, concluded that "there is a con-
siderable amount of evidence to suggest that such sharing of income
cannot be taken for granted."9 She found four standard patterns of
money management which were characteristic of different types of
families:
90 Bittker, supra note 18 at 1392.
91 Mockler, Smith & Frenette, supra note 61 at 63-72.
92 Ibid. at 80, 84.
9 McIntyre & Oldman, "Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplified Income
Tax" (1977) 90 Harv. L. Rev. at 1578, 1594.
" Thorson, supra note 18 at 116.
91 Pahl, University of Kent, "Patterns of Money Management Within Marriage" (1980) 9 J.
of Soc. Pol. at 314.
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1) the whole wage system, characteristic of olden days and of fami-
lies living on social assistance or social security today. Under that
system, the husband hands over his salary or benefit cheque to his
wife who manages all their financial affairs. Pahl found that "[w]hen
money is very short, ... managing the budget becomes a chore
rather than a source of power within the marriage."9
2) the allowance system, typical of working and middle-class fami-
lies where the wife stays home and the husband gives her an "allow-
ance" or "wage", not so much related to the husband's actual income
as to some community norm of an appropriate sum. Sometimes, the
husband keeps back as much as half of his income. Thus, writes
Pahl, "more affluent households offer the possibility of greater ine-
quality between husband and wife."
97
3) the pooling system, mainly characteristic of newly married
couples where both husband and wife are earning. This does not al-
ways give the wife more financial power, however, because her earn-
ings are often used for household expenditures, while the man keeps
more of his money for personal use. "The pooling system also seems
to be more common among those who have received a longer than
average education."98
4) the individual control system, which is still quite rare, gives both
spouses who are very well off full control over their individual
sources of earned or unearned income.
Applying this information to determine whether spouses generally
pool and share all or most of their income and assets, the answer we
get is yes and no. Yes, it appears that couples with very low incomes do
share everything because they have no choice. At the other end of the
scale the answer is no; spouses who each have substantial incomes and
assets do not tend to share much at all. Among middle-income people,
sharing seems most common when the spouses are young and have sim-
ilar incomes and least frequent when the wife has no income and stays
home. In fact, with the single exception of the very poor, the earnings
and assets of couples are generally controlled and managed by the
spouse who has legal title to them.
These findings negate the basic justification of joint taxation since
control of the family's income and assets by both spouses has always
been one of its central elements.
... the extent to which members of the ... units share in the making of deci-
96 Ibid. at 330.
97 Ibid. at 331.
98 Ibid.
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sions on the extent and form of expenditures and saving of pooled funds. . . has
been an important factor in the determination of the existing social and economic
units of society and therefore must be an important factor in the determination
of the size and extent of the tax units. 99
The one exception to the belief that control is an important factor
was presented in the 1977 McIntyre and Oldman article mentioned
earlier. The authors rejected property interest rules and control criteria
and concluded that "(t)axing the income to those who actually con-
sume or accumulate it regardless of source seems intuitively more equi-
table and provides a basic principle to govern how the tax system
should take domestic sharing arrangements into account." [emphasis
added]100 Basing themselves on the legal support and obligations and
the traditional assumption of pooling, McIntyre and Oldman concluded
that both spouses consumed and accumulated in equal shares, so each
of them should be taxed on half the couple's total income.
McIntyre also wrote that:
For perhaps 90% of the population, consumption is going to be 90% of disposable
income. . . . As a rough figure, we can assume that 40% of family income is
spent on housing and utilities. This,. . . we can assume, is shared .... The next
consumption item in order of importance is food. . . . Food takes something like
20 to 39% of disposable income. That income I assume is universally
shared....
Another big consumption item is clothing. It is not my experience that the
husband typically has a much larger clothing budget than the wife. Therefore, on
the three traditional essentials, which make up probably 60 to 70% of disposable
income for the overwhelming majority of North American families, there is very
little doubt ... of a sharing of income.101
The first criticism of these views is that the facts and figures Mc-
Intyre cites above are pure invention. Statistics Canada figures show
that the average Canadian family spends 44% of its after-tax income
on the three basic items of food, shelter (including utilities) and cloth-
ing. 10 2 If this is also true for the other Western countries, there is a
great deal of room for individual decision and choice in the financial
affairs of most middle and upper-income families in the industrialized
world. Secondly, the idea that the person who should pay tax is the one
who has "beneficial enjoyment" of the income was not very popular. It
was accused of being a consumption tax which would not even be im-
99 London, Tax and the Family, supra note 61 at 84.
100 McIntyre and Oldman, supra note 93 at 1577.
101 McIntyre, Taxation of the Family: Economic Mutuality and the Need for Joint Filing
(1979) 1 Can. Tax. at 14-15.
102 Calculated from Canada, Statistics Canada, Income Distributions by Size in Canada,
1978 at 37 and Family Expenditure in Canada, 1978 at 24.
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posed on the true consumer. 0 3
Even more fundamental was the lack of realism of McIntyre and
Oldman's belief that marriage still is, and will continue to be, a funda-
mentally stable and reliable support institution. This is contradicted by
most family law experts, including Prof. Glendon, who foresees "the
decline of marriage as a support institution and the decline of the fam-
ily as a status determinant." She adds that:
The attenuation of family ties, and the ease with which family members can and
do enter and leave the unit in the twentieth century, are both indicators and
motors in a state of affairs in which family members are no longer so dependent
on the unit for security and social position as they were in the past.'"
The result, she believes, will be the fulfilling of Sir Henry Maine's
prophecy about the "emergence of the self-determining, separate indi-
vidual from the network of family and group ties. 10 5
Because of changes such as women's mass entry into the labour
force, the phenomenal rise in divorce rates and the growing tendency to
equalize the legal treatment of married and unmarried couples, Glen-
don writes, this transformation will soon be complete. Employment and
government programmes have largely replaced the family as people's
main sources of status and financial support. This was echoed by the
participants in a Brookings Institution conference who believed that
"marital status or living arrangements are too fragile a thing on which
to hang important consequences" and therefore favoured a system of
mandatory separate taxation.106
It therefore appears that the pooling hypothesis on which joint tax-
ation systems are founded is made of quicksand. In a society where
most spouses keep control over their own earnings and assets, and
where close to 40% of marriages end in divorce,107 it is impossible to
argue with any conviction that husbands and wives have the same abil-
ity to pay. Instead, the best measure of any person's ability to pay is
that individual's personal income and the fairest tax unit is the
individual.
While this disposes of the first element of the fairness criterion, it
103 Moerschbaecher, supra note 30 at 136-37.
104 Glendon, "Modern Marriage and Its Underlying Assumptions: The New Marriage and
the New Property" 8 Fam. L. Quarterly at 447, 455. See also Buchhofer & Ziegert, "Family
Dynamics and Legal Change: Empirical Sociology in Search of a General Theory on the Effects
of Law on Family Life" (1981) 12 J. of Comp. Fam. Studies at 397.
100 Allen, Introduction to Maine's Ancient Law (1959 ed.) cited in Glendon, supra note 104
at 455.
" Sunley, Jr., Summary of the Conference Discussion Comprehensive Income Taxation
(1977) at 272.
107 McKie, Prentice & Reed, Divorce: Law and the Family in Canada (1983) at 64.
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does not settle the second, which requires that all types of income be
taxed in the same manner unless there is a good reason not to do so.
This problem arose in the United States following Lucas v. Earl,108 in
which it was held that the spouses could split their incomes by giving
each other assets, but were not allowed to do the same with respect to
their earnings.
The only two ways of equalizing the treatment of earned and
unearned income under an individual taxation system are:
1) Canadian-style attribution rules, which ignore the transfer of in-
come and income-producing assets between the spouses and tax the
products in the hands of the transferor-spouse. At present, these pro-
visions are glaringly defective and could be much improved.
2) Permitting and recognizing, for tax purposes, the real and irrevo-
cable transfers of earnings and income that take place between fam-
ily members. In a case such as Lucas v. Earl, as well as under com-
munity of property regimes where the spouses have joint rights of
ownership and control, the spouses would be entitled to split all their
incomes between them for tax purposes. Technical "rights of owner-
ship" without real control, such as existed under the old community
property regimes analyzed in Poe v. Seaborn,109 would not be recog-
nized since they do not increase the current ability to pay of the
poorer spouse.
Once again, these two approaches reflect different beliefs about
the nature of the marital relationship. The first is based on the long-
standing common law principle that the spouses are one, so transfers
between them are never real and should be dismissed as mere "bed-
chamber transactions" without practical significance. From that view-
point, anything that would lower the tax burden of some spouses rela-
tive to that of single people or other couples should be rejected as
meaningless and "artificial". Professor Boris Bittker commented on this
attitude of the American courts:
For at least 50 years, a major theme in the taxation of income from property
transferred within the family has been that bedchamber transactions are suspect
because the allocation of legal rights within the family is a trivial matter.110
Bittker subtly pointed out that if income splitting had been ac-
cepted in cases such as Lucas v. Earl, it would have encouraged all
couples to enter into sharing agreements and the result would have
been equal taxes for same-income couples. He added:
'os Supra note 22.
09 Supra note 20.
110 Bittker, supra note 18 at 1394.
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• . .it is far from self-evident that the property rights won by married women are
inconsequential. . . . Taxpayers pass up many opportunities to reduce their
taxes by intrafamily gifts, possibly from ignorance or inertia, but perhaps be-
cause they attach more significance to their legal rights than academicians
assert . ..
It may be, therefore, that tax theorists have excessively downgraded the im-
portance of legal rights within the family, and that a swing of the pendulum is in
the offing.""1
Tax professor Lynda Sands Moerschbaecher is part of that swing.
On the one hand, she writes, "no valid tax policy or reason exists for
allowing a hypothetical income split with a spouse, usually a wife,
when no real split of income or control of assets has occurred. 1' 12 On
the other hand, she adds:
Ideally, the tax law would recognize the income splitting of community property
and permit it where the state's community property laws bear economic sub-
stance and reality by granting actual ownership and control to both spouses (as
does California law since 1975, and others). Thus, in states of actual joint own-
ership and control, the concept of taxing the income to the one who earns it or
the income from the property to the one who owns it is not violated by the 50-50
community property split.'
Matrimonial property laws and agreements are very significant. If
they weren't, why would women's .battle for equal rights over family
property have been so bitterly resisted for the last hundred years? Why
is it that even today, with the exception of a few community property
jurisdictions in the United States, none of the five countries studied has
granted wives equal rights over their families' income and assets during
the course of the marriage?" 4
Very specifically, why didn't Canadian men rush to pressure their
provincial governments into adopting community of property regimes
with joint control when the Sura decision made full income splitting
possible? Why is it that, in spite of the ease with which Canadian
spouses could circumvent their country's attribution rules, 44% of mar-
ried men who earned more than $40,000 in 1981 had wives with in-
comes so low (less than $3,200) that the husbands were able to claim
the marital exemption? 15 If we exclude a further 45% of husbands in
111 Ibid.
112 Moerschbaecher, supra note 30 at 135.
113 Ibid. at 144.
114 For France: Robert, Les rapports patrimoniaux (1979) at 57; for Great Britain: Thom-
son, "English Law", The Reform of Family Law in Europe (1978) at 43; for the United States:
Freed & Foster, "Family Law in the Fifty States: An Overview" (1983) XVI(4) Fain. L. Quar-
terly; for Sweden: Ligdberg, The Reform of Family Law in the Scandinavian Countries (1978) at
201; for Canada: Dulude, Love, Marriage and Money (1984).
115 Canada, Revenue Canada Taxation, Taxation Statistics, 1983 Ed. at 162-63.
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that income group whose wives were in the labour force and therefore
had personal incomes,116 we are left with at most 11% of husbands who
were married to penniless wives to whom they transferred income-pro-
ducing assets to reduce their tax.
This supports the conclusions that sharing is far from the norm
between spouses and that legal rights are valid indicators of real con-
trol over income and property. This being so, it would be fair to recog-
nize matrimonial regimes and marriage contracts for tax purposes as
well as all other types of real and irrevocable transfers between the
spouses.
2. Neutrality
Ostensibly, the neutrality criterion is straightforward. When tax
experts write that "[t]he decision to marry or not to marry should not
be affected by tax considerations"' 11 or that "[tihe incentive for a
member of the family to earn should not be blunted by tax considera-
tions which depend upon the economic position of other members of the
family"," 8 their meaning is quite clear.
In spite of this, the neutrality criterion is far less than absolute.
Some non-neutral aspects of the tax system do not seem to bother any-
one. For instance, while many suggest that a higher tax following mar-
riage may discourage people from getting married, nobody has pro-
tested the other side of the equation - that favourable treatment of
married couples might discourage people from seeking a divorce. Such
selectivity in identifying the possible negative consequences of non-neu-
trality indicates that this criterion is closely tied to current social
norms.
That the troublesome aspects of non-neutrality of the tax unit vary
from time to time and from place to place confirms this. The disincen-
tives to labour force participation by wives is the main example: while
Sweden identified this problem in the early 1960s, it was not recog-
nized until much later in Great Britain and the United States, and is
still not seen as a major impediment in France.
Finally, some tax experts and policy makers have stated outright
that neutrality is sometimes not desirable. For example, the French
"quotient" system officially endorses pro-natalist values; some theorists
believe that "tax-free transfers are desirable between spouses""19 or
"I Canada, Statistics Canada, Income Distribution by Size in Canada, 1982 at 71,
117 Institute for Fiscal Studies, supra note 50 at 378.
118 Ibid.
'19 London, Tax and the Family, supra note 61 at 92.
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that the tax system should promote "the equalization of women in the
society".120 These comments indicate that neutrality should be set aside
in pursuit of valid social goals.
None of the above means that the neutrality criterion is not impor-
tant. On the contrary, as Jack London pointed out, to ignore it is to
risk widespread "discontentment, frustration and anger. The result may
be non-cooperation and increased tax evasion .. ."I21 To avoid this, a
tax system must follow criteria that "correspond as far as possible to
current social attitudes, customs and practices." 22 Neutrality criterion
arguments have coalesced around three main situations: marriage, em-
ployment of wives and family transfers.
a) Neutrality in the marriage decision
The only way in which a tax system can be simultaneously pro-
gressive and neutral on the marriage decision is if married and unmar-
ried people are taxed on exactly the same basis. Any special treatment
of married couples, whether through French-style splitting, British-
style aggregation with a single rate schedule, American-style multi-rate
system or Canadian-style marital exemption, will tax some spouses
more heavily or less heavily than had they remained single.
According to Bittker, the increasingly loud American call for a
marriage-neutral system "stems sometimes from the conviction that the
state should neither encourage nor discourage marriage by a tax incen-
tive or penalty, and sometimes from a belief that ceremonial marriages
in today's society are not sufficiently different from informal alliances
to warrant a difference in tax liability."123 Two other reasons can be
added: first, marriage does not, in itself, make a woman a dependant;
second, many traditionalists, especially in the United States, believe
that the so-called "tax on marriage" reflects an anti-family attitude.x24
Nevertheless, some experts still believe that tax has little effect on
the marriage decision. As late as 1975 and 1976, Jack Londona25 and
Richard Goode 26 were citing the 1954 U.K. Royal Commission on the
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid. at 87.
122 Ibid.
123 Bittker, supra note 18 at 1395.
124 Carr, Statement Before the Subcommittee on Taxation and Debt Management, Senate
Finance Committee, on the Tax Treatment of Married and Single Taxpayers (1980) at 153. At
the three White House Conferences (on Families), no issue drew more support than the proposal
to eliminate the marriage tax.
125 London, Tax and the Family, supra note 61.
2 Goode, The Individual Income Tax (1976) at 231.
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Taxation of Profits and Income which was "sceptical of the suggestion
that men and women are in fact dissuaded from marriage by any such
nice calculation of the financial odds" and thought that "the reasons
that impel men and women to prefer marriage to more casual associa-
tions are many and powerful. 12 7 This view is now hopelessly old-fash-
ioned. In 1976, the Canadian Interdepartmental Committee on the
Taxation of Women reported that if joint taxation was introduced in
Canada and a tax on marriage ensued, many couples would not marry
until the woman left the labour force to have a child and could take
advantage of the system to minimize their taxes. 28
Common law unions have tremendously increased during the last
two decades. About 16% of Swedish couples are now cohabiting with-
out marriage 29 and 6% of Canadian couples described themselves as
"common law partners" in the Census of 1981.130 Margrit Eichler
wrote that:
It is not impossible to imagine that if the taxation system were to start to seri-
ously discriminate against married people, a substantial portion of cohabitants
might be very reluctant to participate in a legal marriage, even after a very long
period of cohabitation.131
Assuming that the tax treatment of married couples affects peo-
ple's decision to marry or not, and further assuming that such an effect
is undesirable, four main proposals have been made to avoid this: 1)
mandatory separate taxation with no special provision for marital sta-
tus; 2) joint taxation with optional filing as singles; 3) joint taxation
with an earned income deduction or credit for the wife; and 4) taxing
common law couples as if they were married.
(1) Mandatory separate taxation with no provision for marital status
When such a system was proposed in Canada'3 2 and in Great Brit-
ain,'33 the criticisms were: i) a marital status deduction is necessary
when the wife has no earnings to compensate the husband for support-
ing her; ii) the marital deduction recognizes the contribution of home-
127 U.K. Royal Commission of the Taxation of Profits and Income, supra note 32 at 36.
128 Canada, Interdepartmental Committee on the Taxation of Women (1976), Report at 19.
129 Trost, "Cohabitation Without Marriage in Sweden" in Eekelaar & Katz, eds., Marriage
and Cohabitation in Contemporary Societies (1980) at 16-22.
10 Norland, Common Law Unions in Canada, 1981: Selected Socio-Economic Characteris-
tics (1984).
13, Eichler, Families in Canada Today (1983) at 126.
132 Supra note 73 at 299.
133 U.K. Equal Opportunities Commission, The Taxation of Husband and Wife: Response of
the Equal Opportunities Commission to the Government Green Paper (1981).
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makers to society; iii) the absence of such a deduction would - at least
in Canada - result in taxing some one-earner couples on incomes far
below the poverty line.
These criticisms were answered as follows:
a) On the cost of supporting a non-earning wife - It is incorrect to
include a wife at home in the dependent class since "[i]n most cases
the wife who works at home as a housekeeper, far from being a de-
pendant, performs essential services worth at least as much to her
husband as the cost of the food, shelter and clothing that he provides
for her." 134 As a result, tax exemptions or deductions that treat the
wife as a financial burden are inappropriate.
b) On recognizing the contribution of homemakers - People who
believe the marital status exemption is a type of recompense for the
housewife's work are mistaken since the exemption's purpose does
just the opposite. The way to achieve such recognition of homemak-
ers' work would be to tax one-earner families more than the others
rather than less.1
35
c) Taxing families below the poverty level - Unlike the others, this
is a real problem. One proposed solution would have low-income
families complete an additional tax schedule reporting their total in-
come and exempting them from tax if the total is below the poverty
line for a family of its size. Another possibility is a vanishing marital
status exemption that would diminish and eventually disappear as
the single earner's income rises.
(2) Joint taxation with optional individual filing
This proposal has gathered considerable support in the U.S. Con-
gress.113 The British Green Paper of 1980 also favoured this option (as
well as separate taxation) .137 Under a system of optional filing, taxpay-
ers could choose whichever tax schedule produced the lower tax. In
both the United States and Great Britain, this would abolish the tax
penalty on some two-income couples while retaining the marriage bo-
nus enjoyed by one-earner families. The main criticisms of this propo-
sal are:
234 Supra note 73 at 293-94.
135 Hartle, Taxation of the Incomes of Married Women, Study No. 5 of the Royal Commis-
sion on the Status of Women in Canada (1971) at 41-43.
'36 Gilliam, "Marital Status and Individual Income Taxation: The Equitable Issues" (1981)
4 Detroit College of L. Rev. at 1095. In 1981, a bill to this effect presented by Congresswoman
Milicent Fenwick had 209 sponsors.
137 U.K. Chancellor of the Exchequer, supra note 32 at 15-16.
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i) The tax system would be strongly pro-marriage for one-earner
couples.
ii) It is a patchwork answer of dubious theoretical validity. It as-
sumes that one-earner couples share everything while two-earner
couples do not; this does not at all correspond to the evidence on
pooling and sharing in families that was reviewed in the previous
section.
Finally, some of the supporters of optional separate filing see it as
a viable means of transition from a system of joint filing to one of indi-
vidual taxation.138 A precedent for this exists in Sweden, where op-
tional filing for earned income served such a purpose between 1965 and
1970.
(3) Joint taxation with an earned-income reduction for wives
Great Britain took this approach in 1894, Sweden between 1952
and 1964 and the United States in 1981. According to U.S. Senate
reports, there were three main policy considerations for adopting this
measure:
i) the desire to keep joint taxation despite its many critics;
ii) the need to distinguish between one and two-earner couples to
account for the added expense of earning two incomes; and
iii) the reduction in the tax increase which results from stacking the
incomes of the spouses.1 39 The report added that "alleviation of the
marriage penalty is now necessary because large tax penalties on
marriage undermine respect for the family by affected individuals
and for the tax system itself."' 40
This provision has been criticized because it does not eliminate the
whole of the tax penalty and because it reduces it in a very arbitrary
manner. For example, Lynda Sands Moerschbaecher calculated that
this new American provision eliminates from 14% to 40% of the tax on
marriage depending on the spouses' incomes and the share earned by
each of them.' 4 ' A similar proposed solution, a tax credit instead of a
deduction, would also have given arbitrary results - from a 10% to a
246% correction of the tax on marriage, according to
Moerschbaecher1 42
138 Moerschbaecher, supra note 30 at 143.
139 Cited in Gilliam, supra note 136 at 1094.
140 Ibid. at 1087.
1"1 Moerschbaecher, supra note 30 at 140.
142 Ibid. at 141.
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(4) Taxing common law couples as marrieds
If unmarried cohabiting couples paid the same taxes as married
people, this would eliminate any incentive for couples to marry or avoid
marriage to minimize their taxes. Such a system could still distinguish
between taxpayers with a live-in mate and others, but the difference
would be based on lifestyle rather than marital status. This has been
the practice in Sweden since 1960. The United States also made a
move in that direction when it ruled that "sham divorces" whose sole
purpose was to reduce couples' taxes would not be recognized for tax
purposes.
Outside Sweden and a few other countries (including Austria and
Belgium),' 43 however, the idea of taxing common law couples does not
arouse much enthusiasm. The main argument is that it would consti-
tute "an unacceptable and intolerable invasion of individual pri-
vacy". 4 Proposals to allow cohabiting couples to elect the status they
want were also rejected because:
Unless an election is irrevocable for all time, taxpayers will always elect that
status which produces the maximum annual financial advantage. . . .Further-
more, it would be extremely difficult to rationalize an irrevocable election when
the parties have chosen to live in a relationship that because of its informal struc-
ture can be easily terminated.1
45
On the other hand, after noting that many other laws now recog-
nize "relationships equivalent to marriage", Jack London recom-
mended that persons who cohabit for a year or more, and persons who
cohabit and have a child together, be treated as married spouses for
purposes of the tax system. 46 McIntyre and Oldman also wrote that
"if income pooling among single persons becomes a common feature of
our society, and there are signs that it is so becoming,. . . [w]e may
have to develop a fiscal definition of marriage which includes de facto,
informal marriage-type relationships existing for longer than, say, two
years.' 47
If cohabitation outside marriage continues to increase as expected,
countries with tax systems that impose a larger burden on people who
marry may soon have no choice but to impose the same treatment on
common law partners. Otherwise, they will experience the same
" Reuterswtird, "General Report on the Income, Fortune and Estate Tax Treatment of
Household Units" (1972) 57 Cahiers de droit fiscal international at 1-5.
144 Krishna, "Selectivity in Tax-Transfer Programs and the Tax Unit Problem" (1980) 2
Can. Tax. at 166.
1,5 Ibid.
148 London, Tax and the Family, supra note 61 at 132.
147 McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 93 at 1597-98.
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problems of widespread marriage avoidance and disrespect for the law
that forced Sweden to act in 1960.
(5) Conclusion on neutrality in the marriage decision
There are only two effective ways of achieving a marriage-neutral
tax system:
1) Mandatory individual taxation without provision for marital sta-
tus, but with a mechanism to prevent very-low-income families from
paying tax on incomes below the poverty line.
2) Taxing unmarried cohabitants in the same manner as legally mar-
ried couples.
The other two methods proposed, joint taxation with optional filing
as singles and joint taxation with an earned-income deduction or credit
for wives, are not neutral toward the marriage decision. Optional filing
might be desirable if the goal pursued were to promote marriage or to
effect a transition from a joint to an individual system of taxation.
b) Neutrality toward the employment decision of wives
When complaints were first expressed in the 1950s about joint tax-
ation unfairly increasing married women's taxes, 48 many tax experts
denied that the system did any such thing. Oldman and Temple wrote
that joint tax did not violate the notion of women's equality "since hus-
band and wife are treated the same for the purpose of calculating the
tax on the married couple as a unit."'1 49 A French tax expert echoed
this view in 1981 when she wrote that it was incorrect to say that ag-
gregation penalized wives who have paid jobs "since legally the wife's
income is no more added to that of the husband than the husband's
income is added to that of his wife". 50
By 1965, however, economists such as Thorson were impatient
with such subtleties. He wrote that "inclusion of the wife's income is
likely to result in higher marginal rates of tax for her than if she were
single. . . . The individual tax unit is the only alternative in the treat-
ment of single and married women that is neutral in this respect."' 15'
Bittker agreed with this analysis, adding that:
In theory, of course, the burden arises whether the "secondary" wage earner is
the husband or the wife, and hence falls on the couple jointly. In a society that
148 See Ritz, "Notes: The Married Woman and the Federal Income Tax" (1958) 14 Tax L.
Rev. at 437.
Oldman & Temple, supra note 80 at 602.
150 Zoller, supra note 13 at 363. (author's trans.)
"' Thorson, supra note 18 at 117.
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takes the husband's job for granted and views the wife as the secondary wage
earner, however, it is reasonable to describe the existing state of affairs as biased
against women.152
These remarks imply that joint taxation is unfair toward wives un-
less their marriage is an economic partnership in which both spouses
have equal access to and control of their belongings; little evidence ex-
ists to support the sharing hypothesis. Also, taxing the income of the
poorer spouse at a much higher rate than if that spouse were single
may act as a disincentive to married women's participation in the la-
bour force, particularly after a period spent at home with their young
children. A woman may feel that the additional income she would
bring into the family would not be worthwhile since the first dollar she
earned would be taxed at the highest rate imposed on her husband's
income.
The problem is further aggravated because taking a paid job en-
tails new expenditures (for items such as clothes, food and transporta-
tion) and because, if the family is to maintain the same standard of
living, a good chunk of the increase in income may have to be spent on
the services (such as child care) that the wife provided before. As we
saw in Part I, the need to compensate families of employed wives for
additional expenses resulting from their absence from the home has
long been recognized. The British introduced an exemption on wives'
earnings in 1894; Sweden had an earned income deduction followed by
a deduction for child care; Canada introduced a child-care expenses
deduction in 1970; the United States has a child-care expenses credit
as well as an earned income deduction to lighten the burden of two-
earner couples.
These measures show that: (1) tax reductions for employed wives
are necessary under all tax unit alternatives; and (2) the basic joint
taxation principle of same-income couples paying the same tax is too
simplistic.
Returning to the question of the disincentive effect of high tax
rates on the labour force participation of married women, we find that
until quite recently, there were important geographical differences in
perception. In a 1972 international survey, continental European coun-
tries such as Belgium, Finland, Germany, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands all reported that their joint taxation systems had a nega-
tive impact on married women's readiness to take up paid employ-
ment.1 53 Belgium even said that by being unfavourable to married
152 Bittker, supra note 18 at 1433.
"' Reuterswdrd, supra note 143 at 1-12.
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women, its tax system was encouraging the development of an under-
ground female labour market.
1 54
The United States also reported a disincentive effect, but attrib-
uted it "not to the tax system as such but to a comparatively insignifi-
cant detail in it, namely the fact that the deductions for costs are inad-
equate. ' 155 American tax then experts believed that the "taxation of
working wives, while inequitable, does not deter them from work-
ing.' 56 Justification for that belief was found in British and American
studies about the work motivation of male executives and
professionals.
1 57
Grace Blumberg challenged this: "Such research should probably
not be used to measure the effect of tax disincentive on wives,"'' 0 and
argued that average wives are less likely than male executives to work
for motives such as "power, prestige or sense of identity"; that a wife
who is contemplating taking a paid job will mentally deduct from her
prospective income not only the high taxes she would have to pay, but
also the additional expenses the household would incur; that male moti-
vation to be employed is stronger because everyone expects men to have
paid jobs; that men do not have re-entry problems since they never
drop out; and finally, that the studies involved general tax increases
without societal judgments, while the tax treatment of wives under a
joint taxation system sent every married woman a clear message that
her proper place is the home.
59
Blumberg's views were vindicated soon afterwards. Economist
Michael Boskin's 1973 study concluded that "the net effect of the tax
system is clearly to drive female labor out of the market into the home
and to reduce the (market-oriented) human capital accumulation of
women relative to men."' 60 By 1977, U.S. tax experts had accepted the
validity of the disincentive argument. The Treasury Department's
Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform of that year noted that:
I" Ibid. at 1-14.
15 Ibid. at 1-12.
158 Blumberg, "Sexism in the Code: A Comparative Study of Income Taxation of Working
Wives and Mothers" (1972) 21 Buffalo L. Rev. at 88.
111 Cited in Blumberg, ibid. at 89.
158 Ibid.
119 Ibid. at 89-90.
180 Boskin, "The Effects of Government Expenditures and Taxes on Female Labor" (1974)
64 Am. Econ. Rev. at 252. These results were confirmed by several other American and British
economists, including Robert Hall, Harvey Rosen, Christine Greenhalgh, Aline Quester, Jane
Leuthold and Janet Hunt. Only one study (Alice Nakamura and Masao Nakamura, in 1981)
reached contradictory conclusions concerning women who are already employed, but even it
agreed that taxes have an important influence on wives who are thinking of re-entering the labour
force.
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A system of joint family filing may cause an efficiency loss to the economy;
namely, the discouragement of labor force participation by secondary workers in
a family. If a partner not in the labor force is thinking of entering it, the tax rate
that person faces is the marginal rate applying to the prospective total income.
This rate may be much higher than for a single wage earner. This consequence
of family filing is sometimes referred to as the "wife tax"."'1
Some see the increase in married women's labour force participa-
tion rates (McIntyre quoted a 90% participation rate - which includes
women who held a paid job for one day in their entire lives)1 62 as prov-
ing that joint taxation is gender neutral. However, as Gann comments,
it could be that the participation rate of American wives would have
reached 60% or 70% by 1979, instead of 50%, had it not been ham-
pered by the high tax rates that joint taxation imposed on their
earnings.163
Assuming that joint taxation does have a disincentive effect on
wives' employment, then, and that this effect is bad for a variety of
reasons including economic efficiency and the promotion of women's
independence, let us turn to the main proposals that have been made to
correct the situation. Leaving aside the question of child-care expenses,
which will be analyzed later, these proposals are:
1) Joint taxation with an earned-income deduction or credit for the
second earner spouse
This method is used in Great Britain and the United States. Its main
disadvantage is that earned-income deductions and credits produce
erratic results, overcompensating some wives while undercompensat-
ing others. In Great Britain, wives in professional positions continued
to exert strong pressure on their government until, in 1971, they
were finally allowed to file separate returns for their earned income.
2) Lower tax rates for married womenThis was proposed by econo-
mists, such as Boskin, who wished to maximize economic efficiency.
He wrote that because the labour elasticity of wives is about six
times greater than that of husbands, "it is clear that short-run effi-
ciency requires much higher tax rates on husbands (more accurately,
primary earners) than on wives (secondary earners).' ' 4 Most tax ex-
perts were appalled by the idea and felt that "if one follows this
efficiency logic, one would end up with a highly differentiated tax
101 U.S. Department of the Treasury, Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform (1977).
162 McIntyre, "Prolegmoena to Future Arguments for Individual Filing in the Personal In-
come Tax" (1979) Tax Notes at 766-7.
163 Gann, supra note 29 at 43.
W4 Boskin, "Factor Supply and the Relationships Among the Choice of Tax Base, Tax Rates,
and the Unit of Account in the Design of an Optimal Tax System" in H. Aaron & M. Boskin
eds., The Economics of Taxation (1980) 154-55.
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system that would strike most people as unjust, unworkable, and
having no obvious appeal. 18 5
3) Separate taxation of earned incomelt is generally agreed that
taxing earned income on an individual basis solves the problem of tax
disincentives for married women who are thinking of taking a paid
job. This is certainly true if the separate taxation system adopted
does not contain too many "threshold" barriers such as marital sta-
tus exemptions and transferable deductions between spouses.
c) Neutrality toward transfers of property within the family
When tax experts worry about the tax unit's neutrality toward
transfers of property between family members, what they mean is that
"[e]conomic and financial arrangements within the family (e.g. as re-
gards the ownership of property) should not be dominated by sophisti-
cated tax considerations."166 The two assumptions here are first, that
the choice of one tax unit rather than another will encourage a signifi-
cant degree of property rearrangement between family members and
second, that the consequences of this rearrangement would be negative.
Both of these assumptions need re-evaluation. On the first, in Can-
ada, where it was very easy for wealthy taxpayers to split their income
and assets with their spouses, only a small proportion took advantage of
it. (Tax practitioners deny such evidence by saying they have encoun-
tered many such cases,167 but this is akin to doctors saying that the
population must be very unhealthy because they meet so many sick
people.) In fact, old assumptions that most spouses would seize all pos-
sible opportunities to split their incomes may well be obsolete now that
"current levels of marital instability have probably made cavalier
transfers of asset ownership quite risky."
1 8
The second assumption is that transfers between family members
have neither positive value nor practical significance. As discussed ear-
lier,169 many feminists challenge this attitude. They argue that if tax
laws recognized property transfers between spouses, the result would be
more financial autonomy for women and an incentive to adopt matri-
monial property regimes of true sharing between the spouses.
l Sunley, Jr., supra note 106 at 273.
168 Supra note 50 at 377.
167 London, "Taxation of the Family: The Family as the Basic Tax Unit" (1979) 1(4) Can.
Tax. at 7.
168 Quester, "Women's Behaviour and the Tax Code" (1979) 59 Soc. Sc. Quarterly at 676.
169 Moerschbaecher, supra note 30 at 135.
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3. Simplicity
A good tax system must not be too difficult for taxpayers to under-
stand and must be relatively easy to administer.
a) Easily understood by taxpayers
The tax systems that are most easily understood are those based
on one or at most two simple basic principles. Such is the French-style
splitting or "quotient" system (the income is spread over the members
of the family, with each child counting as half a person). The original
British and Swedish pure aggregation systems (the head of the family
declares its income and gets a deduction for each dependent) and the
Canadian individual taxation system (each person pays tax on his or
her income) also meet that requirement.
Conversely, the public has difficulty understanding tax systems
whose basic components are more or less arbitrary. One example is
multiple tax schedules based on dubious or unverified assumptions.17 °
Another is complicated deductions or credits (such as earned-income
deductions for second earners) whose amounts are determined by
purely political considerations. If our self-assessment tax system re-
quires "a gentle balancing of the revenue requirement and the relative
contentment of the populace," 11 then having a straightforward system
without fancy deductions and schedules is definitely preferable.
b) Easily administered
In 1976, Canadian tax administrators' description of the "ideal" tax
system,1 72 is:
(1) The tax unit should be easy to identify
Revenue officials were strongly opposed to taxing common law
married couples in the same manner as legally married ones because
they felt they "would be faced with an almost impossible monitoring
task."17' When it was suggested that a couple might be allowed to elect
to be treated as married or not for tax purposes, they
... quickly concluded that such a system would be open to too great abuse. This
would be particularly the case in respect of taxpayers who own income producing
property. Under an elective system, in year one a taxpayer with such property
170 See Part IIB of text - the relationship between various taxpayers.
"7 London, Tax and the Family, supra note 61 at 87.
717 Supra note 128.
173 Ibid. at 8.
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could elect to be treated as married and transfer income producing property to
his dependent spouse with no capital gains tax exigible. In the next year the




Administrators expect the worst and assume that the minimization
of taxes is the most important motive for people's actions. They do not
realize that most people would be extremely hesitant to transfer sub-
stantial assets to someone who is not their spouse.
(2) Financial transactions between spouses should not be recognized
Although the Canadian tax system is based on the individual, its
tax administrators assume that most couples make their financial deci-
sions as a unit and would not hesitate to take steps to minimize their
total tax burden. As a result, they felt that matrimonial property laws
and agreements had no practical value and should be ignored, and that
"a chance to permit an employer to deduct his spouse's wages could
result in wide-scale illegal income splitting among businessmen and
their spouses."1 7 5 Politicians showed their disagreement with this view
in 1979, when they repealed the Canadian provisions preventing the
deduction of spousal salaries. Sweden made the same change in 1976.
Ensuring that the rules disallowing intra-family property transfers
for tax purposes are observed is frustrating, since Canadian laws are
helpless against large-scale income splitting schemes engineered by so-
phisticated lawyers, (though less so now than before the May 1985
budget), but ruthless toward average taxpayers who cannot afford pro-
fessional tax planning advice. However, Canadian tax administrators
did not complain about inadequacies or loopholes of the attribution
rules; they simply proposed that the issue be made irrelevant by the
adoption of spousal joint taxation.
On the same issue, the Australian Tax Review Committee of
1975, remarked:
The appeal of compulsory aggregation to many is that it is considered, despite its
modern reliefs, allowances, options for separate assessment, etc., to be the "sim-
ple" way of combatting income-splitting .... In Australia in 1975 ... any test
of "simplicity" which produces discrimination against such a large and important
section of the population as its husbands and wives should not be introduced into
any legislation.Y7 8
Assuming there was a country which had individual taxation, but
174 Ibid.
175 Ibid. at 13.
176 Asprey, Aggregation of Incomes of Husband and Wife in Family Unit Taxation (1975)
at 15.
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no provisions to prevent the recognition of transfers of any kind be-
tween spouses, it would be almost impossible for tax administrators to
manage the resulting situation. It is mind-boggling to imagine what
would happen if they had to give effect to thousands or even millions of
individually-tailored marriage contracts. A compromise would inevita-
bly have to be developed on that count, probably at the expense of
perfect fairness.
(3) The fewer returns, the better
Another attractive administrative feature of joint taxation is its
significant reduction in the number of tax forms.
In addition to these three considerations, two other administrative
or semi-administrative issues occasionally arise in connection with the
tax unit. They are: 1) the question of which spouse should be liable for
what portion of the tax and 2) the alleged necessity of joint taxation as
a pre-condition to the introduction of a negative income tax.
c) Liability for the tax
The bitter and long-standing controversy concerning who should
be legally responsible for the payment of the income tax in countries
with joint taxation systems supports the belief that most spouses do not
pool and share their income. The main bone of contention 177 is that a
spouse can be required to pay tax on income over which she or he has
no rights of property or control. A Carter Commission background pa-
per expressed the problem succinctly when it said that "it might be
difficult to persuade the fairer sex in Canada that her property ought to
be subject to a lien for taxes on income earned by her husband.' 117 8
In an attempt to solve the difficulty, London proposed:
In the event of joint filing each spouse would be required to sign the return and
to attest to the accuracy of the information in that return affecting that person or
emanating from that person. Liability for tax would fall on each member of the
unit individually in the ratio of that portion of the tax that the net income of the
177 U.K. Chancery of the Exchequer, supra note 32 at 11; Boll6, supra note 17; Savatier, "Le
r6gime matrimonial et la contribution respective des 6poux aux impat" (1979) 23 Recueil Dalloz
Sirey at 147; Ritz, supra note 148 at 437-448; Bradley, "Community Property - Federal Income
Tax Liability of Wife During Existence of Community" (1971) 46 Tulane L. Rev. at 329-335;
Emory, "New Law Alleviates Innocent Spouse - Joint Return Problem on Omitted Income"
(1971) J. of Tax. 154-157; Anthony, Jr., "Federal Tax Liability of the Wife for Community
Income Earned by the Husband" (1972) 32 Louis. L. Rev. at 471-478; Quick & Du Canto, "Joint
Tax Liability and the Innocent Spouse Doctrine in Common Law and Community Property Juris-
dictions: A Review of Code Section 6013(e) and Its Progeny, Section 66" (1983) 17 Fam. L.
Quarterly at 65-87.
178 Mockler et aL, supra note 61 at 98.
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individual member of the unit is of the entire income of the unit.'7 9
However, the Canadian Interdepartmental Committee on the Tax-
ation of Women rejected that approach because "it would reintroduce
the complexity which the joint return is supposed to significantly
reduce."'' 0
d) The tax unit and the negative income tax
When proposals for a guaranteed income for everyone were first
developed, one of the "purest" models designed was that of a negative
income tax that would be grafted to present "positive" tax systems and
be a mirror image of them. As a negative income tax for poor families
had to be calculated on the basis of their total income, it was assumed
that the "positive" tax system to which it would be connected would
also have to use the family unit.
Although the political chances of such a "pure" model being im-
plemented anywhere were never very good, the idea has lingered in the
tax community that a negative income tax could not be implemented
outside a joint taxation system. Woodman concluded that a system of
joint taxation may be inevitable in the future because of
... the introduction of a guaranteed income in Canada. The introduction of a
national scheme would be virtually impossible without its integration with the
income tax system. Furthermore - and this is its significance - for reasons of
cost alone, if not also of equity, a guaranteed income scheme would require the
adoption of the marital unit. 81
However, Canada has introduced two separate national negative
income tax programmes without having to abandon the individual as its
unit of taxation. These are the guaranteed income supplement for the
aged (1967) and the refundable child tax credit (1979), which are both
claimed by filing a separate form declaring the family's total income.
B. What Differences Should Exist Between the Tax Burdens of Peo-
ple Living in Different Circumstances?
This analysis ignores the previous discussion's conclusion regarding
the superiority of individual over joint taxation, and examines the rela-
tionship between taxpayers under joint as well as separate tax systems.
One reason for doing so is that joint taxation systems are unlikely to
170 London, Tax and the Family, supra note 61 at 130.
"' Supra note 128 at 18.
181 Woodman, "The Taxation Unit" in Hansen, Krishna & Rendall eds., Essays on Cana-
dian Taxation (1978) at 103.
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disappear very soon and will continue to affect millions of taxpayers for
some time. Such a study may also shed more light on the choice of unit
debate. Finally, it is also possible that such study will reveal principles
that apply regardless of the unit chosen.
The three main circumstances analyzed in this section are mar-
riage, parenthood and the employment status of the wife. The main
focus is on relationships between single and married taxpayers, between
people with and without children, and between two-earner couples and
all other taxpayers.
1. Relationship between single and married people
a) Under individual taxation
The basic principle of individual taxation is that each person pays
tax on his or her own income, with deductions or credits being used to
recognize family responsibilities. Opinions are irremediably split, how-
ever, on whether a spouse with no personal income is or is not a depen-
dant. Those who insist that a wife at home is a dependant point to the
cost of the food, shelter and clothing, for which her husband pays.
Those who say she is not a dependant argue that such costs are only
partial payment for the services a homemaking wife provides:
The man whose wife works inside the home has a much higher standard of living
than a bachelor with the same salary. The bachelor would have to pay a small
fortune to provide himself with all the services a wife provides without charge to
her husband and family.
182
The main difference is that the first group does not believe the tax
system should take the value of homemakers' services into account,
while the second group insists that it should. Since this dispute is also
relevant to the debate over the treatment of one-earner compared to
two-earner couples, we will pursue this discussion later in that context.
b) Under joint taxation
There are two main schools of thought in this area. The first, em-
bodied in the French full-splitting system (and that of the United
States between 1948 and 1969), is that couples should pay twice as
much tax as two single people who each have half the couple's income.
The second, first formulated by Oldman and Temple in 1960 and the
favourite of American, British and Canadian tax theorists, includes two
elements:
182 Dulude, Background Study on Women and the Personal Income Tax System (1976) at
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(1) One single person should pay the same or a greater tax than the
married couple with one income, since the advantages of joint living
are never so great that two can live more cheaply than one.
(2) The dual-income couple should, in turn, pay a greater total tax
on its two incomes than would be paid by two single persons with
corresponding incomes.18 3
The Carter Commission incorporated these principles in its own
proposed joint taxation system, but added two qualifications:
1) At the bottom of the income scale there are often diseconomies to mar-
riage. . . . Consequently,. . . there should be a lower tax for low-income indi-
viduals, upon marriage, so that the total tax on the couple would in no case be
greater than the sum of the taxes on the separate individuals. 2) At the very top
of the income scale, marital status has relatively little effect on discretionary
economic powers. . . . The increase in tax upon marriage for such people should
consequently be relatively smaller than for individuals with less income who
marry.'"
Neither Oldman and Temple nor the Carter Commission cited any
studies of spending patterns that would support their assumptions.
When critics protested that more solid data was required to justify a
system which resulted in a much-resented tax on marriage,185 Jack
London answered that:
First, just as there is as yet little evidence of the net economies involved in co-
habitation, there is no empirical evidence of diseconomies to the contrary. Hope-
fully, as time passes further and better evidence will become available. Secondly,
one may in this area rely adequately on intuition and generalization. [emphasis
added188
When some evidence did appear, it did not support the economies-of-
scale argument. In 1978, Gerzog reported that 62.5% of single persons
shared a home with someone else;187 it was therefore incorrect to as-
sume that most people's expenses went down as a result of cohabitation
after marriage. McIntyre and Oldman agreed:
The great variety of living arrangements which now characterize our society un-
dermines the economies of scale argument for persons above the subsistence
level. Generalities about economies of scale are no longer, useful. 188
As Oldman had been co-author of the original economies-of-scale the-
ory, this dealt it a serious blow.
183 Oldman & Temple, supra note 80 at 603-4.
"I Supra note 73 at 15.
185 Smith, Rates, Allowances and Averaging (1967) at 32.
London, Tax and the Family, supra note 61 at 113.
187 Gerzog, "The Marriage Penalty: The Working Couple's Dilemma" (1978) 47 Fordham
L. Rev. at 35.
188 McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 93 at 1595.
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At the other end of the spectrum, unmarried Americans com-
plained about the 20% tax differential in favour of one-earner couples
which resulted from implementing these principles:
They point out that many singles have dependants and similar family responsibil-
ities as married persons, but are forced to pay higher taxes. . . .(They) say that
singles have the same standard of living as a one-job married couple with the
same total income. The earner in each group incurs similar expenses for food,
shelter and clothing. To expend money to support a spouse, singles argue, is a
personal choice of consumption, and should not be a factor used in increasing a
single's relative tax rate. Further, even if the cost of providing for an unemployed
spouse results in higher spending for a married earner than a single person, the
increased cost is reflected in the personal exemption allowed for each spouse and
should not be further reflected in the rates. Single people also note that the im-
puted income of an unemployed spouse's housework, etc., should increase the
one-job couple's taxpaying ability, not decrease it to less than a single person's
computed ability to pay.
189
Upon reviewing all these criss-crossing arguments, Bittker con-
cluded that "the tax rate differential between single and married per-
sons rests - and must rest - on judgments as subjective and political
as those that determine the degree of progression in the rate schedule
itself." 90
2. Relationship between people with and without children
This section will deal only with the physical cost of raising a child,
meaning the parents' expenditures for providing them with food, hous-
ing, clothing, et cetera. Child-care costs will be discussed in the context
of the relationship between two-earner families and other taxpayers.
a) Under individual taxation
Discussions about the tax treatment of children are remarkable for
their lack of objectivity. At one ideological extreme are people who
maintain that spending money on children is "a form of pleasurable
consumption, a characterization implying that these expenditures are
no more entitled to a tax allowance than the cost of the taxpayer's food
and clothing."'19' At the other extreme are groups such as the Quebec
Status of Women Council, which believe that parents fulfill a public
service and should receive financial assistance amounting to the full
cost of bringing up children.192
189 Rothblum, "Tax Equity for Marrieds and Singles: A Permanent Dilemma?" (1976) Tax
Notes at 8.
00 Bittker, supra note 18 at 1426.
190 Ibid. at 1445.
92 Quebec, Conseil du statut de Ia femme, Pour les Qu becoises: ggalit et ind~pendance
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i) Flat-rate deductions that reduce parents' taxable income. This has
been criticized because its benefits rise with the taxpayers' in-
comes,193 but its defenders maintain that such an effect is legitimate
since wealthy parents spend more on their children than do poor
ones.
1 9 4
ii) Flat-rate credits - Credits are deducted from the amount of tax
payable and give equal benefits to all who owe enough tax to take
advantage of them. Their critics point out that this does little or
nothing for the neediest parents whose taxes are very low or nil.
iii) Taxable or non-taxable cash transfers - These are not tax ben-
efits, but periodic transfer payments sent to all parents by social wel-
fare authorities. Sweden opted for them when it eliminated all provi-
sions for children from its tax system in 1947. Great Britain followed
the same route in 1979.
iv) Vanishing refundable tax credits - These, which include the
Canadian refundable child tax credit referred to earlier, are a form
of negative income tax. They are paid out as a "refund" to parents
who are below the tax threshold and diminish in value as incomes
increase, eventually disappearing altogether.
None of the approaches described above is intrinsically "correct" or
"incorrect"; most countries use a mix of tax and transfer benefits. This
situation is changing, however, and the OECD reports that, since 1974,
there has been a tendency among its members to move away from tax
deductions in favour of tax credits and, to an even greater extent, to-
ward systems of cash transfers. The OECD explains this as follows:
The fact that more countries have been moving over to the cash transfer system
may not be unconnected with the move . . . from joint taxation to individual
taxation as individual taxation tends to confer the greatest benefit on two-earner
families at high income levels, and governments may feel that such families
should not receive, as parents, the additional advantage of having their income
tax liability reduced more than that of lower income parents.' 9
b) Under joint taxation
Everything said above about the recognition of parenthood in the
tax system also applies under systems of joint taxation. In addition,
joint taxation countries must decide whether or not to include children
(1978) at 170 A 175.
,93 National Council of Welfare, Family Allowances for All? (1983).
'" Salyzyn, Canadian Income Tax Policy: An Economic Evaluation (1976) at 87.
'9' Supra note 84 at 30.
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in their basic tax unit.
The debate over the inclusion of children in the tax unit has
evoked strong feelings: The standards applied are also much stricter
than those used in the debate over the joint taxation of wives. The
Carter Commission research team recommended taxing spouses jointly
despite any concrete evidence of sharing, but rejected the inclusion of
children because "[w]e have little or no statistics on . the validity of
the premise that the income of minor children is pooled and shared
with all the family."196 Bittker showed the same double standard when
he accepted joint taxation of spouses but balked at proposals to include
children's income because "self-imposed or even legal restrictions on
"197the use of such income are not uncommon".
Salyzyn, who accepted the idea of spousal aggregation without
question, thought that the inclusion of children would create "perverse
incentives":
One of these was that the high marginal tax rate applicable to the earnings of a
child would have discouraged the taking of summer and part-time employment.
The other would have encouraged children to leave home to establish their own
taxpaying units (with new exemptions and lower marginal tax rates), or even
worse, parents would be encouraged to ask their children to leave in order to
reduce the overall tax bill. Clearly, such inequities would have been socially
unacceptable. 198
On the other hand, the supporters of the inclusion of children's
income are those whose main goal is to avoid income splitting between
family members. Sander explained the problem when he said that
"[i]ndeed, since our unit does not encompass children, we still encoun-
ter that problem in all its colourful variations, ranging from the estab-
lishments of trusts for minor children to the creation of family partner-
ships with two-year-old children." 199 McMahon argued that parents
had much greater control over their children's income than husbands
had over the income of their wives:
The . . premise that parents lack effective control over their children's income
is doubtful. First, effective control may be achieved by parents' withdrawal of
discretionary contributions to their children, thus forcing the children to use their
income for purposes for which the parents previously supplied funds. Addition-
ally,. . . (m)ost often the income from property of a minor child is under the
control, directly or indirectly, or the parents of the child or his grandpar-
ents. . . . Parents are most frequently appointed the guardians of the property
19 Mockler et al., supra note 61 at 63, 72.
17 Bittker, "Income Tax Reform in Canada: The Report of the Royal Commission on Taxa-
tion" (1968) 35 Univ. of Chicage L. Rev. at 647-649.
:98 Salyzyn, supra note 194 at 88.
99 Sander, Who is Taxed: The Tax Unit, 1967 Conference Report of the Canadian Tax
Foundation, on the Report of the Royal Commission on Taxation at 19.
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of their children regardless of the source of the funds .... 200
The case for the aggregation of children's incomes is much
stronger than the case for the joint taxation of husbands and wives. As
the first is difficult to achieve without the second, and as the aggrega-
tion of all categories of children's incomes is very unpopular (even
France allows separate returns for children's earned income and
unearned income from sources unconnected to their fathers), the best
compromise might be partial aggregation through the use of Canadian-
style attribution rules. These provide that whenever income-producing
property is transferred to a child under 18, that income is aggregated
with that of the transferor for tax purposes.
3. Relationship between two-earner couples and other taxpayers
a) Description of the problem
Earlier, it was mentioned that housewives thinking of taking paid
employment mentally deduct two kinds of expenditures from their pro-
spective earnings: the first includes the additional costs such as clothes
and transportation required for work outside; the second is the cost to
replace the child-care and housework services these women themselves
provide when they are at home.
The problem of the first type of expense is relatively easy to solve.
Since practically everyone who has a paid job incurs such additional
expenditures, what is required is an employment expenses deduction or
credit for all earners. Different rates of tax for earned and unearned
incomes could also be used, but this makes the system much more com-
plicated and appears less fair.
The second kind of expense is more difficult to handle. The prob-
lem 20 1 is the existence of the so-called "imputed income" of homemak-
ers. The easiest way to understand this is to compare two different
situations:
Household A is composed of a single man who earns $30,000 a year
and his full-time female housekeeper, whose salary amounts to
$8,000 (including some cash and the value of her in-kind benefits
00 McMahon, Jr., "Expanding the Taxable Unit: The Aggregation of the Income of Chil-
dren and Parents" (1981) 56 N.Y. Univ. L. Rev. at 89-92.
201 Shoup, supra note 85 at 134; D. Thorson, supra note 18 at 116; Pechman, "Statement
Before the U.S. Congress Joint Economic Committee" in Economic Problems of Women (1973)
at 253; Popkin, "Household Services and Child Care in the Income Tax and Social Security
Laws" (1975) 50 Ind. L. Rev. at 241; Sheppard, "The Taxation of Imputed Income and the Rule
in Sharkey v. Wernher" (1973) 51 Can. Bar Rev. at 637-638; Cuvillier, "L',pouse au foyer: une
charge injustifibe pour la collectivit6" (1977) 12 Droit social at 436; Barr, "The Taxation of Mar-
ried Women's Incomes, Part I" (1980) 5 Br. Tax Rev. at 410.
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such as free room and board). Both pay tax on their respective in-
comes. He cannot deduct his housekeeper's salary since it is a per-
sonal expense which is not necessary to earn his income.
Household B is composed of the same two people, but the man and
his housekeeper have now married each other. She still produces
$8,000 worth of housekeeping services, but he no longer gives her a
salary as such and she no longer pays tax. In addition, his own tax is
diminished through the use of joint taxation or a marital status de-
•duction or credit.
The question this example raises is whether the extremely advan-
tageous tax treatment enjoyed by Household B is fair toward two-
earner couples and other taxpayers who must either do without the ser-
vices of a full-time housekeeper, or hire one without being able to de-
duct anything for these services. Most experts agree that such a state is
unjust because "the taxable income of the one-earner couple is under-
stated in that it does not include the value of services provided by the
spouse who stays at home.
20 2
McIntyre and Oldman express one of the rare exceptions to this
view. They write that:
In examining the widely held perception that one-job couples have more imputed
income from these (household) services than two-job couples have, we are unable
to refer to existing empirical studies. In any case, empirical verification of this
perception may be impossible. 203
However, they are mistaken; dozens of American, Canadian and other
time-budget studies have provided empirical confirmation that the
value of the household services enjoyed by families diminishes radically
when wives take outside jobs. 04 Typical data show that "employed
women devote about half as much time to household tasks as unem-
ployed women. ' 20 5 The other problem is our example is that it is not
really Household B which receives an undue benefit, but Husband B,
who gets all the advantages of the situation. He benefits from the same
domestic services as before, but at a lesser cost, and in addition pays
tax on a lower amount. For her part, his wife is much worse off than
before. She is doing the same work, but has lost her claim to a regular
income and is no longer protected by income security programmes such
202 Break & Pechman, Federal Tax Reform: The Impossible Dream? (1975) at 35.
203 McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 93 at 1614.
201 Hawrylyshyn, "The Value of Household Services: A Survey of Empirical Estimates"
(1976) 2 Rev. of Income and Wealth at 101-131; Szalai, "Women's Time: Women in the Light of
Contemporary Time-Budget Research" (1975) 7 Futures at 385-399.
205 Vanek, "Time Spent in Housework" in The Economics of Women and Work (1980) at
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as unemployment insurance and a pension plan.
b) Proposed solutions
The five solutions proposed to come to grips with this are:
1) taxing the value of homemakers' services;
2) granting tax reductions to taxpayers who do not enjoy untaxed
homemaker services; or
3) paying a salary to homemakers and taxing them on it.
4) abolishing the spousal exemption; and
5) transforming the spousal exemption into a refundable credit paya-
ble to wives at home.
(1) Taxing homemakers' services
Many tax economists and lawyers believe the best way to solve the
problem of the untaxed value of homemaking services would be to tax
the imputed income of homemakers. 206 Having said this, most invaria-
bly add that this is "non-feasible". 20 7 When Douglas Hartle designed
such a system for the Canadian Royal Commission on the Status of
Women 20 8 it was rejected because of the administrative problems and
because it was ". . .undesirable that a married woman who stays at
home keeping house for her family and having no income of her own
should be liable for a tax which her husband would have to pay.
209
These objections miss the point. There is indeed something unde-
sirable about taxing housewives on the full value of their services, but it
is hidden by the misleading language used to define the question. Most
obscuring is the erroneous use of the term "imputed income" to refer to
homemakers' services. If this were corrected, the real issues would be
clearer and a solution might emerge.
The Carter Commission defined "imputed income" as arising
"when an individual who owns productive assets, or who supplies pro-
duction services, uses them directly to produce goods and services that
he consumes himself. ... 210 This definition does not fit the work of
housewives well at all. True, some part of homemakers' work is devoted
to their own maintenance, but for the most part, housewives do not
"consume themselves" the services they produce. It is their husbands
'0' See references, supra note 201.
107 Musgrave, supra note 27 at 344.
208 Hartle, supra note 135 at 41.
209 Royal Commission on the Status of Women in Canada at 298.
210 Supra note 73 at 47.
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and children who do.
If most of the value produced by homemakers' work is not im-
puted income, then what is it? There are two different categories: first,
to the extent that housewives' work is compensated by the value of the
"free" food, shelter and clothing they receive from their husbands, they
are in exactly the same position as any employee who receives income
in kind; secondly, above the level of the in-kind wages they receive,
what housewives do is volunteer work which benefits their husbands
and their children. Inasmuch as raising children benefits all of society,
housewives also do volunteer work for the state.
Given these facts, it is difficult to support the proposal that the
value of housewives' work be taxed. Their income in kind is probably
not worth more than the basic exemption ($4,140 in Canada in 1985),
and one can imagine the howls of protest if husbands were singled out
from all the people who benefit from volunteer work and asked to pay
tax on the services they receive from their wives.
(2) Offsetting benefits for non-homemaker households
If the value of homemakers' services cannot be taxed, many people
have said the next best method is to give compensating tax reductions
to those who don't have access to such untaxed services.21 Two-earner
families and single parents could claim deductions or credits for their
child-care costs or the lower-earning spouse could receive an earned-
income deduction or credit.
Earned-income deductions and credits have been criticized for be-
ing too complicated and for producing erratic benefits. There are other
controversial aspects of offsetting benefits: do tax reductions granted
only to two-earner couples discriminate against other groups of taxpay-
ers? Is the tax system the most appropriate avenue to compensate par-
ents for child-care expenses and, if so, should these expenses be treated
as business expenditures? To what extent are such offsetting benefits
needed in individual taxation systems?
First, the example of Households A and B shows that the failure
to tax homemaker services results in all other households being disad-
vantaged, so an offsetting benefit for only two-earner couples discrimi-
nates against all the other non-homemaker households. The only miti-
gating factor is that the work disincentive effect is much stronger in the
case of married women. On the other hand, it makes sense to compen-
211 Thorson, supra note 18 at 116; J. Pechman, supra note 201 at253; Cooper, "Working
Wives and the Tax Law" (1970), 25 Rutgers L. Rev. at 70; Sheppard, supra note 201; Marshall,
"Some Economic Aspects of Family Property Rights Reform" (1974) 1 Br. Tax Rev. at 35-36.
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sate child-care costs only for non-homemaker households with young
children (meaning two-earner parents and single parents in the labour
force), since they have additional expenses that are not borne by child-
less people.
The second area of controversy concerns the proper treatment of
child-care expenditures. The U.S. Citizens' Advisory Council on the
Status of Women concluded in 1968 that tax deductions are "inade-
quate", "inequitable" and "ineffective" in helping to provide adequate
care for the children of employed mothers, and that:
Liberalization of the deduction by extending it to higher income levels, raising
the limits on the amount of the deduction and increasing the age limit for chil-
dren will not improve its effectiveness. . . .Such changes would simply provide
tax relief to those families able to make expenditures for the care of children and
disabled dependents.212
Instead, the Council recommended that the government intervene di-
rectly to "stimulate the development of facilities and services for provi-
sion of the needed care of children of working mothers" and "give sub-
stantial encouragement to community efforts to develop such organized
facilities as day care centers. . . .Such services should be available to
families at all income levels, with charges on the basis of the ability to
pay. .... "213 Although this position is supported by feminists world-
wide, it is hampered by two sizeable political factors. One is the reluc-
tance of governments to commit the large sums necessary to subsidize
decent systems of child care services. The other is the self-interested
support of professional women for the maintenance and even the exten-
sion of child-care deductions.
This has led to numerous debates on the question of whether the
tax system should recognize child-care services through a deduction,
which gives benefits that increase with a person's income, or through a
credit, which gives the same benefit to all those who owe enough tax.
The credit approach was adopted in the United States, but Canadian
women's groups have so far not persuaded their government to follow
suit. The position of the Canadian government and of high-income pro-
fessional women has been defended as follows:
Child-care expenses, by their very nature, are incurred for the purpose of earn-
ing income (or, in the case of a student, for the purpose of earning future in-
come). Just as a business woman who has a high overhead (expensive furniture
and well-paid staff) may claim the full amount of these expenditures, so ought
parents who pay for child care be entitled to claim the amount actually spent.
212 Citizen's Advisory Council on the Status of Women, Report of Task Force on Social
Insurance and Taxes (1968) at 96-106.
213 Ibid. at 104-105.
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This in no way confers an "unfair advantage" on higher income families. To
claim the deduction, one must first make the expenditure.
21 4
This argument has always been rejected by the courts, which held
that:
Petitioners would have us apply the "but for" test. They propose that but for the
nurses the wife could not leave her child; but for the freedom so secured she
could not pursue her gainful labors; and but for them there would be no income
and no tax. This thought evokes an array of interesting possibilities. The fees to
the doctor, but for whose healing service the earner of the family income could
not leave his sickbed; the cost of the labourer's raiment, for how can the world
proceed about its business unclothed; the very home which gives us shelter and
rest and food which provides energy might all by an extension of the same pro-
position be construed as necessary to the operation of business and to the crea-
tion of income. Yet these are the very essence of those "personal" expenses the
deductibility of which is expressly denied.2 15
This does not mean that the tax system should not take child care
expenses into account, but that there is no necessary rationale for doing
it through a deduction or for linking it to an actual expenditure. Arnold
concludes that these costs should be taken into account, and recom-
mends the implementation of a credit to help parents with their child-
care costs because: 1) the case for treating them as business expenses is
"rather tenuous"; 2) he believed that deductions would not be as effec-
tive in neutralizing the work disincentive of wives; 3) this recognized
reduced ability to pay and 4) credits helped lower-income taxpayers
whose relative ability to pay is most heavily affected.2 16 Since the pros-
pect of a universally available child-care system is still very remote, the
author agrees with this analysis and supports its conclusions.
The final controversy is whether or not offsetting benefits are
needed in a system of separate taxation. The previous discussion con-
cluded that compensation for child-care expenditures was needed, but
the same question arises about compensating for non-homemaker
households for their additional housekeeping costs. No one in Canada
has expressly addressed this question, but the Interdepartmental Com-
mittee on the Taxation of Women implicitly disagreed, finding that
separate taxation already produces enough or even too much of. a dif-
ference between the respective tax burdens of one and two-earner fami-
lies.217 Another argument against offsetting benefits for housekeeping
214 Blain, A Preliminary Review of the Income Tax Act, and its Implications for an Em-
ployment Strategy for Women (1979) at 15.
"I' Smith v. Commissioner (1939) 40 B.T.A. 1038, aff'd per curiam, I13F. 2d 114 (2d Cir.
1940).
21' Arnold, The Deduction for Child Care Expenses in the United States and Canada: A
Comparative Analysis (1973) 12 Ont. L. Rev, at 26-27.
217 Supra note 128 at 11.
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services is that they would make Canada's tax system much more com-
plicated and difficult to understand.
(3) Paying homemakers a salary
Some people have suggested that we should pay homemakers a
salary which would be taxed.2 18 Whatever the intrinsic merits of this
proposal, it is difficult to see how it could solve the problem of the
undervaluation of homemakers' work, since it would make one-earner
families even better off in comparison to two-earner families.
(4) Abolishing the spousal exemption
The Canadian Royal Commission on the Status of Women con-
cluded that:
In all justice the married status exemption should not be given when there is no
dependent in the family. We believe that a woman does not become economically
dependent-by virtue of her marriage. If she is in fact dependent, it is the result of
the couple's personal choice. A childless couple has the right to decide that the
wife will devote all her time to homemaking but there is no reason why the State
should attach an advantage to this choice by giving the husband a married status
exemption.
219
The controversy that arose when Status of Women Minister Judy
Erola expressed similar ideas in 1983 shows that public opinion is far
from unanimous. The -main obstacle is housewives who, deprived of any
compensation for their work, do not see the marital exemption as a
denial of their economic value, but as the only measure in the tax act
that grants them some recognition.
(5) Transforming the spousal exemption into a credit for housewives
This proposal offers an unusual interpretation of the role of the
spousal exemption.22 ° It sees all residents of Canada as entitled to a
personal guaranteed income, either through benefits such as welfare,
unemployment insurance, the old age pension or other direct payments,
or indirectly through their personal tax exemption. The only exception
to this universal entitlement is housewives: they are disentitled from
direct income security benefits because of their husbands' incomes, and
are also bereft of their own personal tax exemption because it is given
to their husbands as the spousal exemption.
218 See London, Tax and the Family, supra note 61 at 102-103 andZoller, supra note 13 at
362.
219 Canadian Royal Commission on the Status of Women, supra note 13 at 299.
220 RAIF - Revue d'information pour les femmes, no.77/78, June 1983.
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The proposed method of redressing the situation is to abolish the
spousal exemption and divide the sums thereby recovered between all
homemaking spouses. This would give the same minimal guaranteed
income to all wives at home and produce less regressive benefits than
the present system. On the other hand, the assumption that homemak-
ing wives presently receive nothing ignores the value of their untaxed
in-kind benefits.
c) Summary of the Goals to be Reached
Countries should pursue the following goals when choosing a tax
unit:
1) Each spouse should pay tax on the income that person owns and
controls, since this best indicates his or her ability to pay.
2) Children should be taxed separately on their earned income, but
their unearned income from assets transferred to them by adults
should be aggregated with the income of the donors.
3) Marriage should have no effect on people's tax burden since it
does not in itself change their ability to pay.
4) Marriage should not increase the effective tax burden of married
women because this creates an unjustified and undesirable barrier to
their participation in the labour force.
5) Transfers of property between spouses should be recognized and
encouraged by the tax system because ownership and control reflect
each spouse's ability to pay and because such transfers enhance the
financial independence of women.
6) As much as possible, tax systems should avoid multiple rate
schedules and complicated deductions because they are difficult for
taxpayers to understand and lead to dissatisfaction and non-
compliance.
7) The value of homemakers' services should be recognized through
the provision of child-care expense credits to families where the sin-
gle parent or both parents are employed or at school.
IV. EVALUATION OF THE SYSTEMS OF THE FIVE COUN-
TRIES IN LIGHT OF THE DESIRED GOALS
A. Goal One - Separate Taxation of the Spouses
Of the five countries studied, only France and the United States
aggregate all the income of spouses for tax purposes. (The U.S. option
to file separately is not considered a true one since it penalizes those
who make that choice.) This is widely criticized in both these countries.
Americans particularly resent the "tax on marriage" which results
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from their multiple-schedule system; French people deplore the obso-
lete sexism of the male "head of the family" rule and consider it illogi-
cal that couples who specifically chose to be married under regimes of
separation of property are deemed to form an economic unit for tax
purposes.
The main difficulty facing reformists in both countries is that one-
earner couples and spouses with widely divergent incomes are not will-
ing to abandon the considerable advantages they derive from income
splitting (full splitting in France and partial splitting in the United
States). As a result, the proposals with the greatest chances of political
success are those which reduce the unfairly high burden of two-earner
families without affecting the unfairly low taxes of one-earner couples.
The main example of this is the common recommendation that married
couples be allowed to file as singles when they want. Although the re-
sult might be politically pleasing, it would be complicated, theoretically
unsound and very unfair toward unmarried taxpayers.
Great Britain and Sweden now have mixed systems that tax
spouses jointly on unearned income and separately on earnings. In
Great Britain, most employed wives were already exempted from tax
by generous deductions so it was a simple step to allow all female earn-
ings to be taxed separately. In Sweden, the transition was made with
ease and speed following strong pressure from feminist groups and the
need for more married women in the labour force. Great Britain and
Sweden have now abandoned their former belief in the economic unity
of the couple. Their retention of joint taxation for unearned income is
therefore not based on philosophical conviction, but on the fear of ad-
ministrative complications and of a significant loss of revenue. As the
group adversely affected by taxing unearned income jointly is relatively
small, it may lack the political clout to surmount these obstacles.
Canada is the only country surveyed which taxes all spousal in-
come separately. Its tax system nevertheless contains several joint taxa-
tion features such as a marital status exemption that decreases as the
other spouse's income rises, attribution rules and a number of deduc-
tions that are transferable between husbands and wives. Most of these
measures were introduced in the last fifteen years, indicating that the
Carter Commission's belief in the family as an economic unit did have
a modest impact after all.
B. Goal Two - Partial Aggregation of Children's Unearned Income
This objective calls for the separate taxation of children's earnings,
but for the aggregation of their receipts from income-producing gifts
with the incomes of the donors. The systems in Canada and France
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come close to doing this, though the Canadian attribution rules are full
of holes and France only mandates the aggregation of incomes from
assets which originated from the children's own fathers.
None of the three other countries aggregate any part of children's
incomes with those of their parents or of anyone else for purposes of
the income tax. In Sweden, the only one of the five countries to impose
a fortune tax, the children's wealth is aggregated with that of their
parents in certain circumstances.
C. Goal Three - Marriage Neutrality
None of the five systems studied is marriage-neutral. A 1977
OECD study22' showed the following:
1) In the case of childless one-earner couples where the earning
spouse draws an average salary, the tax saving realized by getting
married (or of being taxed as married, in the case of Swedes)
amounts to 12% for Swedish and British couples, 21% for American
ones, 24% for Canadians and a phenomenal 66% reduction for mar-
ried couples in France.
2) In the case of a childless two-earner couple where both spouses
earn an average salary, the tax difference from being married is a
2% increase in tax for couples from the United States, no change for
Canadian, Swedish and French couples and a 6% reduction in Great
Britain.
This demonstrates how erratic marriage penalties or rewards can
be, depending on the spouses' incomes, the tax units, the tax schedules
and the deductions or credits used. The 66% saving enjoyed by one-
earner average-income couples who marry in France clearly shows why
single people resent full splitting systems, especially when they do not
reflect the respective abilities of the spouses to pay. If the French
couple was married under a regime of separation of property, for exam-
ple, the husband would pocket the entire 66% tax saving and the wife
would have no right to it at all.
D. Goal Four - Neutrality Toward Women's Employment
This subject is much more difficult in practice than in theory be-
cause so many different elements are involved. Among the most impor-
tant are the progressivity of each country's tax schedule(s) and the
presence and amount of deductions to offset the earnings of lower-in-
come spouses. Several aspects must also be considered, including:
221 Supra note 84 at 39, 47.
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1. The difference in tax between employed wives and single women
with the same income
We saw this effect in the section concerning marriage neutrality.
The second example demonstrated what happens when a single woman
who earns an average wage gets married to a man who has the same
salary: her taxes would increase in the United States, decrease in Great
Britain and stay the same in the other three countries.
The increase in the United States, which results from a higher tax
schedule for married people, would be smaller now than when the
OECD study was done because of the introduction of an earned-income
deduction for the lower-income spouses. The decrease in tax in Great
Britain also results from generous earned-income reductions for em-
ployed wives. If the American and British wives' incomes were higher
and surpassed the level of the deductions, however, they would be taxed
at a much higher rate than their single counterparts. In that case, the
American wife would have no recourse, but the British one could avoid
the increase by choosing to file a separate return.
2. The effect of the wife's employment on the family's average tax
rate
A wife who stays home for a while and then returns to paid em-
ployment will raise the family's tax rate. The only exception to this rule
is in Great Britain, where the deductions applied to the wife's earned
income will exempt lower-income married women from paying tax. In
separate taxation countries, such as Canada and Sweden, the increase
in tax which results from the wife taking a paid job is due to the loss of
the marital status exemption. This has a smaller effect than the aggre-
gation of a wife's income with that of her husband in countries with
systems of joint taxation. Overall, the OECD's conclusion on this point
was that:
... the choice of a tax unit is an influential, but not a decisive factor in deter-
mining the relative rate of income tax encountered by the family when a married
woman enters the labour force. The tax unit does become important for the
higher income groups, since the allowance structure, being based as a rule on
absolute amounts, has less influence at these income levels, and the data confirm
the expected result that individual taxation is more advantageous than compul-
sory joint taxation for two-earner families at higher income levels.
222
222 Ibid. at 59.
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3. The effect on the tax rate of the wife
Looking at the wife's tax position alone, we see that the rate of tax
on her income varies greatly depending mainly on the progressivity of
her country's tax rates, but also on the tax unit used. A table prepared
by the OECD to show the tax rates applying to wives earning 33%,
66% and 100% of an average salary (with the husband always earning
a full average salary) gave the following approximate ranges of taxes
on the women's incomes:
Sweden - the rate ranged from a low of 32% for wives earning one-
third of an average wage to 40% for those earning an average salary.
United States - the range was from 22% for the lower-earning
wives to 24% for those earning average salaries.
Great Britain - the range was from a rate of 8% to a rate of 24%
Canada - the range went from 17% for the lower earners to 23%
for the average-income ones.
France - the range went from 9% for those earning one-third of an
average wage to 12% for those earning an average one.
The OECD's conclusions were:223
1) Generally speaking, the countries with the most steeply progres-
sive tax systems and with joint taxation take the largest proportion of
the wife's gross earnings in tax.
2) Exceptions to this rule are found in countries with very high taxes,
such as Denmark and Sweden, where high rates more than offset the
impact of the use of individual taxation.
3) Joint taxation becomes more burdensome as the spouses' incomes
increase.
4) Income splitting or "quotient" systems substantially offset the ef-
fects of aggregation at higher income levels.
E. Goal Five - Encouragement of Inter-Spousal Transfers
The five countries under study can be divided into three groups in
that regard.
1. Canada - Because Canada's system of individual taxation can
give substantial tax savings when the spouses transfer property to
each other, so-called attribution rules were enacted to prevent the
recognition of such transfers for tax purposes. These rules have been
quite ineffective so far, with the result that upper-income people who
could afford to hire tax consultants were encouraged to transfer in-
come-producing assets to their spouses. To extend this advantage to
223 Ibid. at 55-56.
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all Canadian taxpayers and meet the requirements of Goal Five, all
Canada needs to do is repeal its spousal attribution rules except for
cases where the donor has not relinquished effective control over the
property transferred.
2. Sweden, Great Britain and the United States - All three of these
make a distinction between earned and unearned income. The
unearned income of the spouses is always taxed jointly in all three
countries while earnings are or can be taxed separately in Sweden
and Great Britain and give entitlement to a special deduction for
lower-income spouses in the United States. Therefore, no incentive
exists to transfer assets to equalize the spouses' incomes from proper-
ties, but some tax savings can be effected through manoeuvres that
transform the investment income of the richer spouse into a salary
paid out to the poorer one.
3. France - Since France aggregates all the income of the spouses
for tax purposes, its system has no effect on transfers of property
between them.
F. Goal Six - Simplicity
The simplest tax systems are those which are based on a few clear
principles. France and Canada come closest to meeting that goal, with
Sweden not far behind. The American and British systems, with their
multiple and contradictory principles and patches, are much too com-
plicated for ordinary taxpayers to understand.
Administratively, tax officials particularly resent features that re-
quire extensive monitoring and control, such as the Swedish treatment
of common law spouses as if they were married and the Canadian attri-
bution rules. In Canada, this could easily be cured by allowing the free
flow of assets between the spouses for tax purposes.
G. Goal Seven - Child-Care Expense Recognition
The United States is the only country which recognizes the child-
care expenditures of two-earner families and single parents with paid
jobs through the use of tax credits. Sweden and Canada chose instead
to use deductions, although the fact that Sweden has not increased the
level of its deduction since 1971 may indicate a preference for direct
government intervention in helping to set up adequate child-care
facilities.
Great Britain does not have a special measure to recognize child-
care costs, though British widowers and widows are entitled to a special
flat-rate deduction to help pay for a live-in female housekeeper or
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child-minder. In France, a child-care deduction was introduced in 1976
for the sole use of single parents in the labour force.
H. Summary of the Evaluation
None of the countries examined in this study meets all our objec-
tives, although individual or semi-individual taxation countries such as
Canada and Sweden come closest to respecting the most crucial ones.
In spite of these seemingly disappointing findings, the overall picture is
not at all depressing because the changes taking place in all the other
countries show a strong trend toward individual taxation and the recog-
nition of the separate economic existence of the spouses.
This was also the conclusion of the OECD, which found that "[i]n
recent years, a trend away from compulsory joint or family taxation
toward the choice of the individual as the tax unit for earned income
or, at least, the provision of an option for individual taxation is discern-
ible among OECD countries." 224 Between 1970 and 1976, six European
countries switched from joint to individual taxation of the earned in-
come of the spouses (not counting the new British separate tax option).
The main reason for these changes, according to the OECD, is "the
growing importance attached to the status and role of women in
society."22 5
V. CONCLUSION
This study set out to answer four questions about the tax treat-
ment of the family in France, Great Britain, the United States, Sweden
and Canada. These questions concerned the origins of the tax units
used, their relationship with marital property laws, the influence of
community values in the choice of a tax unit and the goals which all
countries should strive to attain in taxing the family.
The first two questions were answered in the historical overview in
Part I. It was found that each of the countries examined started by
assuming that its tax and matrimonial laws should be synchronized,
but that differences subsequently developed when married women ac-
quired more rights (in Sweden, Great Britain and most recently in
France) or when the courts interpreted marital property laws for tax
purposes in ways that many taxpayers found unfair (in the United
States). Whenever such a split occurred between tax and family laws,
it eventually led to strong pressure to reunite the two. This is particu-
224 Ibid. at 15.
225 Ibid. at 18.
19851
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
larly evident in the evolution of the Swedish and British systems, both
of which went from joint to individual taxation of the earnings of the
spouses. Canada is the only country studied whose tax and matrimonial
property laws were always in accord.
The other questions were answered in Part II. Using the three cri-
teria of fairness, neutrality and simplicity as the basis for this analysis,
it was concluded that the tax treatment of the family should strive to
reach the following seven goals:
1. Taxing the spouses separately on all their income, because that is
the best way of adjusting their tax burdens to their capacity to pay.
2. Taxing children's unearned income jointly and their earnings
separately.
3. Making the tax system neutral toward the decision to marry or
not, since getting married does not, alone, affect people's ability to
pay.
4. Promoting the participation of women in the labour force by elimi-
nating tax barriers to it.
5. Encouraging transfers of property between spouses by recognizing
them as valid for tax purposes.
6. Avoiding hard-to-understand tax systems which have multiple rate
schedules and complicated deductions.
7. Providing child-care expense credits to recognize the additional
expenses of families where neither parent stays home with the
children.
When the systems studied were weighed against these standards,
none won a perfect score, but there were very important differences. A
country such as Canada, where all incomes are taxed separately, and
countries like Sweden and Great Britain, where earnings from work are
or can be taxed on an individual basis, meet many of these objectives
and could be changed quite easily to conform to all. The same cannot
be said of France and the United States, whose systems of aggregation
of all spousal incomes with full or partial splitting could not be easily
adapted to meet our objectives. Attempts at reforming these countries'
systems - barely started in France but vigorous for close to twenty
years in the United States - have met very serious obstacles.
These barriers can be traced to the main factors which influence
the evolution of tax units. In our historical review, as well as in the
discussions of the desired objectives, three crucial factors kept recur-
ring. One is the importance of societal values such as the sanctity of
marriage (especially in France) and the promotion of women's equality
(particularly in Sweden). A second one is a country's employment situ-
ation and its perceived need for married women to join the labour force
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(mainly in Great Britain and Sweden). A third factor is the great polit-
ical difficulty, if not impossibility, of achieving reforms that would raise
the tax burden of large numbers of people.
In France, reforms are hampered by a strong combination of tradi-
tional family values and political resistance from upper-income people
who would stand to lose. In the United States, the battle is mainly
between the advocates of women's rights and the huge number of un-
dertaxed one-earner couples, with the political odds still heavily
weighted in favour of the latter. Because of these deadlocks, Professor
Bittker may be right in his belief that the American tax unit problem
can never be solved; according to him, "there can be no peace in this
area, only an uneasy truce.
'2 26
228 Bittker, supra note 18 at 1443.
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